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Earnings Dynamics and Inequality among Men in 
Luxembourg, 1988-2004: Evidence from Administrative Data 
 
Starting with the late 1980s and intensifying after early 1990s, Luxembourg evolved from an 
industrial economy to an economy dominated by the tertiary sector, which relies heavily on 
the cross-border workforce. This paper explored the implications of these labour market 
structural changes for the structure of earnings inequality and earnings mobility. Using an 
extraordinary longitudinal dataset drawn from administrative records on professional career, 
we decomposed Luxembourg’s growth in earnings inequality into persistent and transitory 
components and explored the extent to which changes in cross-sectional earnings inequality 
between 1988 and 2004 reflect changes in the transitory or permanent components of 
earnings. Thanks to the richness of the Luxembourgish data set, we are able to estimate a 
much richer model that nests the various specifications used in the US, Canadian and 
European literature up to date, thus rejecting several restrictions commonly imposed in the 
literature. We find that the growth in earnings inequality reflects an increase in long-term 
inequality and a decrease in earnings instability, and is accompanied by a decrease in 
earnings mobility. Thus in 2004 compared with 1988, low wage men in Luxembourg are 
worst off both in terms of their relative wage and in terms of their opportunity of improving 
their relative income position in a lifetime perspective. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the source of the growth  in earnings  inequality  has  become  a  major topic  in 
economics  over  the  past  two  decades,  fuelled  mainly  by  the  rise  in  earnings  inequality 
experienced by many developed countries during the 1980s and 1990s.  
Starting  with  the  US  and  Canada,  followed  by  UK  and  Europe,  recent  studies  on  earnings 
dynamics have stressed the importance of decomposing the growth in earnings inequality into 
permanent and transitory components, due to their implications for long-run differentials. An 
increase  in  cross-sectional  earnings  inequality  triggered  by  an  increase  in  the  permanent 
component signals an increase in lifetime earnings differentials, suggesting a worsening of the 
relative lifetime earnings position of the chronically poor. An increase in cross-sectional earnings 
differentials  triggered  by  an  increase  in  earnings  instability  signals  an  increase  in  earnings 
mobility,  implying  an  increased  opportunity  for  the  poor  to  improve  their  relative  income 
position in a lifetime perspective.  
In Europe, the advancement and the full potential of this research in understanding the structural 
changes in inequality has been limited, due to insufficiently long panels. Our study aims to fill 
part of this gap.  
The contribution of this study to the literature on earnings dynamics and inequality is twofold. 
First, it aims to expand the research regarding the possible implications of the labour market 
structural changes on the structure of earnings inequality and earnings mobility. The specific 
context of the Luxembourgish labour market, which underwent significant structural changes 
during the last decades, makes Luxembourg a relevant case for studying the structural changes in 
earnings inequality and the implications for lifetime earnings differentials. This study is the first 
of its kind in Luxembourg. Following the tradition of previous studies we focus on men to avoid 
the problem of selection bias characterising female earnings. 
Starting with the late 1980s and intensifying after early 1990s, Luxembourg evolved from an 
industrial economy to an economy dominated by the tertiary sector, which relies heavily on the 
cross-border  workforce.  Moreover,  Luxembourg  recorded  a  large  increase  in  the  number  of 
active population, both residents and cross-borders, which more than doubled in 2004 compared 
with 1988. The change in the structure of the labour market by occupation status (Figure 1), 2 
 
reveals an increase in the share of white collars and civil servants, and a decrease in the share of 
blue collars. The change in the labour market structure by the sector of activity (Figure 2) reveals 
a significant increase in the share of the service sector and a decrease in the share of the industry 
sector. The evolution of the labour market age distribution (Figure 3, upper panel) reveals a clear 
shift in men’s labour market behaviour due to the education system: from a high concentration of 
active men around ages 20-25 in 1988 to a high concentration around ages 25-45 in 2004. The 
change  in the  labour  market behaviour  is confirmed  also by the cumulative age distribution 
(Figure 3, bottom panel), which shifted towards higher ages: e.g. the share of people present in 
the labour market until age 25 is almost double in 1988 than in 1996 or 2004. Following these 
changes cross-sectional earnings inequality increased.  
What are the implications of these changes for the structure of earnings inequality and earnings 
mobility? Using 17 years of longitudinal earnings information drawn from the administrative 
data on the professional career, we decompose Luxembourg’s growth in earnings inequality into 
persistent and transitory components. We explore the extent to which changes in cross-sectional 
earnings inequality in Luxembourg between 1988 and 2004 reflect changes in the transitory or 
permanent components of earnings.  
On  the  one  hand,  did  the  increases  in  cross-sectional  wage  inequality  result  from  greater 
transitory fluctuations and a higher degree of earnings mobility? Or does it reflect increasing 
permanent differences between individuals with mobility remaining constant or even falling? On 
the  other  hand,  did  mobility  influence  falls  in  cross-sectional  inequality?  Understanding  the 
contributions of the changes in permanent and transitory inequality to increased cross-sectional 
inequality  is  useful  therefore  in  evaluating  alternative  structural  changes  hypotheses  and  for 
determining the potential welfare consequences of rising inequality. (Katz and Autor, 1999) 
Second, we exploit our extraordinary dataset to achieve some methodological advances at the EU 
level. The limited scale of most European panels has forced EU researchers to rely on simple 
country models, which impose economically implausible restrictions. For example, the 7 ECHP 
waves available for Luxembourg have forced Sologon and O'Donoghue (2009b, 2009a, 2009c) 
to impose the assumption of invariant permanent component with no permanent shocks (age 
specific or not), no life-cycle variation in the variance of transitory earnings shocks and no MA 
process in the transitory variance. Due to our long panel, we are able to estimate much richer 3 
 
models that nest the various specifications used in the US, Canadian and European literature up 
to date.  
Unlike previous studies, we decompose the analysis by 36 birth cohorts composed of people 
born  in  a  certain  year.  This  small  age  window  allows  the  precise  identification  of  the  two 
components at different lifecycle stages. Equally weighted minimum distance methods are used 
to estimate the covariance structure of earnings, decompose earnings inequality into a permanent 
and a transitory component, estimate earnings mobility and conclude about their evolution.  
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
The  existing  literature  on  earnings  dynamics  is  predominantly  based  on  US  data.  Atkinson, 
Bourguignon et al. (1992) provide a comprehensive survey of the literature on earnings dynamics 
until 1992. Earlier work focused on fitting statistical models to the earnings process. E.g. Lillard 
and Willis (1978), Lillard and Weiss (1979), MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card (1989) fitted 
models to the autocovariance structure of earnings and hours, but they did not account for the 
changes in the autocovariance structure of earnings over time.  
Later work, Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995, 1998, 2002) used PSID to estimate the permanent and 
transitory components of male earnings and how it evolved over time. In Moffitt and Gottschalk 
(1998), the earnings process was fit by a permanent component, modelled as a random walk in 
age  and  a  highly  persistent  serially  correlated  transitory  component,  with  weights  on  these 
components  for  each  year.  They  found  that  the  increase  in  the  cross-sectional  inequality  of 
individual earnings and wage rates in the U.S. between 1969 and 1991 has been roughly equally 
composed of increases in the variances of the permanent and transitory components of earnings, 
with little change in earnings mobility rates. Since most of the theoretical explanations for the 
increase in inequality have been aimed at explaining increases in the variance of the permanent 
component of earnings (e.g. increases in the price of skills), they found their result surprising and 
unexpected. Therefore, in their most recent study, Moffitt and Gottschalk (2008) estimated the 
trend in the transitory variance of male earnings using PSID from 1970 to 2004. They found that 
the transitory variance increased substantially in the 1980’s and remained at the same level until 
2004, for both less and more educated workers. Moreover, the transitory variance appears to 4 
 
have a strong cyclical component: its increase accounts for between 30% and 65% of the rise in 
the overall inequality, depending on the period.  
Using  the  PSID,  Baker  (1997)  compared  two  competing  specifications  for  the  permanent 
component  of  earnings:  the  “profile  heterogeneity  or  the  random  growth  model”  and  the 
“random walk model”. In spite of the increased popularity of the latter, Baker (1997) proved that 
the profile heterogeneity model provides a better representation of the data. 
Baker and Solon (2003) decomposed the growth in earnings inequality into its persistent and 
transitory components using longitudinal income tax records from Canada. The earnings process 
was fit by a permanent component, modelled as a mixed process composed of a random growth 
and a random walk in age and a highly persistent serially correlated transitory component, with 
weights  on  these  components  for  each  year.  They  found  that  growth  in  earnings  inequality 
reflects both an increase in the long-run inequality and an increase in earnings instability.  
Up until recently, little work has been carried out in Europe on the dynamic nature of individual 
earnings. Dickens (2000b) analysed the pattern of individual male wages over time in UK using 
the New Earnings Survey (NES) panel data set for the period 1975-1995. This study divided the 
data into year birth cohorts and analysed the auto-covariance structure of hourly and weekly 
earnings for each cohort. In the tradition of Moffitt and Gottschalk (1998), the earnings process 
was fit by a permanent component, modelled as a random walk in age and a highly persistent 
serially correlated transitory component, with weights on these components for each year. The 
innovative element of their model was the extension of the random walk to a specification that 
allows for age-specific innovation variances until age 40 and a random effects model thereafter. 
The results showed that about half of the rise of the overall cross-sectional inequality can be 
explained by the rise in the permanent variance and the rest by the rise in the persistent transitory 
component.  
Ramos (2003) analysed the dynamic structure of earnings in UK using the British Household 
Panel  Study  for  the  period  1991-1999.  The  earnings  specification  followed  a  similar 
specification with Baker and Solon (2003). Using information on monthly earnings of male full-
time employees, this study decomposed the covariance structure of earnings into its permanent 
and transitory components and concluded that the increase in inequality over the 1990’s was due 
to  increased  in  earnings  volatility.  Moreover, the  relative  earnings  persistency  was  found  to 5 
 
decline over the lifecycle, which implies a lower mobility for younger cohorts. These findings 
are at odds with the previous literature on earnings dynamics both for UK and the OECD. Unlike 
previous literature, this study considered also for the effect of observed characteristics and found 
that  human  capital  and  job  related  characteristics  account  for  nearly  all  persistent  earnings 
differences and that the transitory component is highly persistent. 
Kalwij and Alessie (2003) examined the variance-covariance structure of log-wages over time 
and over the lifecycle of British men from 1975 to 2001, controlling for cohort effects. Their 
model follows closely the specification used by Abowd and Card (1989), Dickens (2000b) and 
Baker and Solon (2003) accounting also for cohort effects. They showed that the increase in the 
cross-sectional  inequality  was  caused  mainly  by  an  increase  in  the  transitory  component  of 
earnings  and  to  a  lesser  extent  by  an  increase  in  the  permanent  wage  inequality.  Thus  the 
increase in cross-sectional inequality was accompanied by an increase in earnings mobility.  
Cappellari (2003) used the Italian National Social Security Institute for the period 1979-1995 and 
decomposed  the  male  earnings  autocovariance  structure  into  its  long-term  and  transitory 
components using a model specification similar with Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995) and Backer 
(1997). The model included a permanent component, modelled as a random growth in age and a 
highly persistent serially correlated transitory component, with weights on these components for 
each  year  and  cohort.  The  findings  showed  that  growth  was  determined  by  the  long-term 
earnings component. Other evidence on the contribution of permanent and transitory earnings 
components  to  cross-sectional  inequality  has  become  available  in  recent  year  in  Sweden. 
Gustavson (2004a, 2009b) used a hybrid model between Baker and Solon (2003) and Dickens 
(2000b) and concluded that the decrease in earnings inequality was due to a decrease in the 
permanent component.  
Most recently, Sologon and O'Donoghue (2009a, 2009b, 2009c) used the 8 waves of ECHP for 
14 EU countries to explore the dynamic structure of individual earnings and the extent to which 
changes  in  cross-sectional  earnings  inequality  reflect  transitory  or  permanent  components  of 
individual  lifecycle  earnings  variation.  Overall,  the  decrease  in  inequality  resulted  from  a 
decrease  in  transitory  differentials  in  Germany,  France,  UK  and  Ireland,  in  permanent 
differentials  in  Belgium  and  Spain  and  in  both  components  in  Denmark  and  Austria.  The 
increase  in  inequality  reflects  an  increase  in  permanent  differentials  in  Luxembourg,  Italy, 6 
 
Greece  and  Finland,  and  an  increase  in  both  components  in  Portugal  and  Netherlands.  The 
decrease in inequality was accompanied by an increase in mobility only in Denmark, Belgium 
and Spain. Except for Netherlands and Portugal, all countries recording an increase in inequality 
experienced also a decrease in mobility. 
3.  THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE DETERMINANTS OF WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 
The theoretical and  methodological specifications  in this section  follow closely Sologon and 
O’Donoghue (2009a, 2009b, 2009c). 
3.1.Determinants of earnings inequality  
As pointed out by Katz and Autor (1999), the existing literature contains many explanations for 
the rise in earnings inequality experienced by many developed countries during the 1980s and 
1990s. One approach for explaining changes in wage differential is to decompose overall wage 
inequality into permanent inequality and transitory inequality. 
Following the terminology introduced by Friedman and Kuznets (1954), individual earnings are 
composed of a permanent and a transitory component, assumed to be independent of each other. 
The permanent component of earnings reflects personal characteristics, education, training and 
other  systematic  elements.  The  transitory  component  captures  the  chance  and  other  factors 
influencing earnings in a particular period and is expected to average out over time. Following 
the structure of individual earnings, overall inequality at any point in time is composed from 
inequality in the transitory component and inequality in the permanent component of earnings. 
The evolution of the overall earnings inequality is determined by the cumulative changes in the 
two inequality components.  
The  rise  in  the  inequality  in  the  permanent  component  of  earnings  may  be  consistent  with 
increasing returns to education, on-the-job training and other persistent abilities that are among 
the  main  determinants  of  the  permanent  component  of  earnings,  meaning  enhanced  relative 
earnings position of the highly skilled  individuals. (Mincer, 1957, 1958, 1962, 1974; Hause, 
1980).  
The increase in the inequality of the transitory component of earnings may be attributed to the 
weakening  of  the  labour  market  institutions  (e.g.  unions,  government  wage  regulation,  and 7 
 
internal labour markets), increased labour market instability, increased competitiveness, a rise in 
the temporary workforce which increase earnings exposure to shocks. A period of skill-biased 
technological change with the  spread of  new technologies can on the one  hand  increase the 
demand for skills, and on the other hand it can increase earnings instability. (Katz and Autor, 
1999).  Rodrik  (1997)  argued  that  also  globalization  and  international  capital  mobility  can 
increase wage instability. Overall, the increase in the return to persistent skills is expected to 
have a much larger impact on long-run earnings inequality than an increase in the transitory 
component of earnings. (Katz and Autor, 1999; Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2002) 
Alternative model specifications for the permanent and transitory components  
Next we introduce several models of earnings dynamics that have been dominating the literature 
on  permanent  and  transitory  earnings  inequality  over  the  past  30  years.  To  begin  with,  we 
introduce the simplest specification, which in spite of its simplicity provides a very intuitive 
insight  into  the  decomposition  of  earnings  into  their  permanent  and  transitory  components. 
Based on this specification earnings are being decomposed as follows: 
 
2 2 , (0, ), (0, ), 1,..., , 1,..., it i it i it v i Y v iid v iid t T i N µ µ µ σ σ = + = = ∼ ∼   (1) 
where  i µ   represents  the  permanent  time-invariant  individual  specific  component  and  it v  
represents the transitory component, which is independent distributed both over individuals and 
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Because i µ   is  assumed  to  incorporate  the  effect  of  lifetime  persistent  individual  specific 
characteristics  such  as  ability,  the  variance  of  the  permanent  component 
2
µ σ   represents  the 
persistent dispersion of earnings or the inequality in the permanent component of earnings. The 
transitory shocks are captured by the transitory variance 
2
v σ  and are assumed to persist only one 
year.  
This model facilitates the understanding of the inequality decomposition into its permanent and 
transitory components. The variance of earnings at a certain point in time, 
2
y σ , as a measure of 8 
 
earnings dispersion, is composed both from a permanent and transitory dispersion (
2 2
v µ σ σ + ). 
The covariances, on the other hand, are determined solely by the permanent component (
2
µ σ ). 
Therefore,  the  assessment  of  the  relative  importance  of  the  two  components  in  the  overall 
earnings dispersion is straightforward: the ratio 
2 2 / y µ σ σ  captures the relative importance of the 
permanent  component,  whereas  the  ratio 
2 2 / v y σ σ   captures  the  relative  importance  of  the 
transitory component.  
Notwithstanding  its  attractive  features,  the  empirical  evidence  rejected  the  rigid  restrictions 
imposed by model (1). One of the main drawbacks of model (1) is that it does not allow for 
changes in earnings inequality over time. (Lillard and Willis, 1978; Lillard and Weiss, 1979; 
MaCurdy, 1982; Abowd and Card, 1989) Other studies (Katz, 1994; Moffitt and Gottschalk, 
1995; Sologon and O'Donoghue, 2009b, 2009a, 2009c) took the model complexity further by 
allowing  the  covariance  structure  of  earnings  to  vary  over  time.  To  account  for  these  time 
effects,  these  models  considered  also  time  specific  loading  factors  or  shifters  on  both 
components, which allow the parameters of the process to change with calendar time.  
1 2 it t it t it Y v λ µ λ = +     (2) 
, 1,2 kt k λ =  are time-varying  factor  loadings on the permanent and transitory components of 
earnings. The variance of  it Y  implied by this model takes the form: 
2 2
1 2
2 2 ( )
t t it v Var Y µ λ σ λ σ = +     (3) 
An increase in either time loading factors generates an increase in the cross-sectional earnings 
inequality.  The  nature  of  the  change  in  inequality  depends  on  which  of  the  loading  factors 
changes. On the one hand, a persistent rise in  1t λ  increases the permanent or long-run inequality 
(inequality in earnings measured over a long period of time, such as lifetime earnings). As  1t λ  
can be interpreted as time-varying return to skills or skill price, its increase suggests that the 
relative  labour  market  advantage  of  high  skill  workers  is  enhanced.  In  this  situation,  the 
autocovariances grow in greater proportion that than the variance, causing the autocorrelation to 
increase. As a consequence, the increase in overall cross-sectional inequality is accompanied by 
a decrease in mobility. On the other hand, an increase in  2t λ  without a change in  1t λ  increases 9 
 
cross-sectional earnings inequality by increasing the transitory inequality, but without any impact 
on long-run or permanent inequality. In this situation the rise in the variances is not accompanied 
by a rise in the autocovariances, hence autocorrelations decrease and the increase in the overall 
inequality is accompanied by an increase in mobility. (Baker and Solon, 2003) As pointed out by 
Katz and Autor (1999),  1t λ  maintains the rank of the individuals in the earnings distribution, but 
causes a persistent increase in the spread of the distribution and an increase in  2t λ  changes the 
rank  of  the  individual  in  the  short-run.  In  other  words  an  increase  in  the  time  parameters 
associated with the permanent component of earnings indicates a growing earnings inequality 
with no impact on the relative position of individuals in the distribution of permanent earnings, 
whereas an increase in the transitory time parameters indicates an increase in earnings mobility. 
Although model (2) incorporates changes over time in the permanent and transitory components 
of earnings inequality, it disregards other important features of earnings dynamics. Firstly, it 
disregards the cohort effects. As argued by Katz and Autor (1999), the increased wage inequality 
may arise from increased dispersion of unobserved labour quality within recent entry cohorts, 
resulting from unequal school quality. Some studies brought evidence against the hypothesis that 
the return to education is the same for different cohorts. These changes could be attributed either 
to the cohort effects or to the larger impact of the labour market shocks on younger than on older 
cohorts of workers. In the same line of thought, Freeman (1975) put forward the “active labour 
market”  hypothesis,  which  postulates  that  changes  in  the  labour  market  conditions,  such  as 
changes in the supply and demand for skills, affect mainly new entrants in the labour market. To 
account for these cohort effects, these models considered also cohort specific loading factors or 
shifters on both components, which allow the parameters of the process to change with cohort. 
(Cappellari, 2003; Kalwij and Alessie, 2003; Sologon and O'Donoghue, 2009b, 2009a, 2009c)  
1 1 2 2 it c t it c t it Y v γ λ µ γ λ = +                   (4) 
where , 1,2 jc j γ = are cohort specific loading factors.
1  
Secondly, regarding the permanent component, some studies brought evidence in favour of the 
“random growth rate model” or the “profile heterogeneity model”: (Hause, 1977; Lillard and 
                                                              
1 This model represents the starting point of our model, which is developed in Section 5. 10 
 
Weiss, 1979; MaCurdy, 1982; Baker, 1997; Cappellari, 2003; Sologon and O'Donoghue, 2009b, 
2009a, 2009c)  
2 2 , (0, ), (0, ), ( , ) it i i it i i i i age iid iid E µ ϕ µϕ µ µ ϕ µ σ ϕ σ µ ϕ σ = + = ∼ ∼       (5) 
According to this model, which is consistent with labour market theories such as human capital, 
and  matching  models,  each  individual  has  a  unique  age-earning  profile  with  an  individual 
specific intercept (initial earnings  i µ ) and slope (earnings growth  i ϕ ) that may be systematically 
related. The variances 
2
µ σ  and
2
ϕ σ  capture individual heterogeneity with respect to time-invariant 
characteristics and age-earnings profiles. The covariance between  i µ  and  i ϕ , ,, , µϕ σ ,  ,  ,  , represents a 
key  element  in  the  development  of  earnings  differentials  over  the  active  life.  A  positive 
covariance  between  i µ   and  i ϕ   implies  a  rising  inequality  in  the  permanent  component  of 
earnings over the life cycle. This is consistent with the school-matching models where the more 
tenure one individual accumulates, the more is revealed about his ability. Thus highly educated 
people are expected to experience a faster growth in their earnings as the quality of the match is 
revealed to their employers. A negative covariance implies that the two sources of heterogeneity 
offset each other, which  is consistent with the on-the-job training  hypothesis (Mincer, 1974; 
Hause, 1980). A negative covariance is expected to generate mobility within the distribution of 
the permanent component of earnings. (Cappellari, 2003) 
This structure is equivalent to a random coefficient model where the intercept and the coefficient 
on age in model (5) are randomly distributed across individuals. Therefore, because earnings 
evolve along an individual specific age profile, a good prediction of future earnings requires 
additional information besides the current earnings. 
An alternative/additional specification for the permanent component of earnings is the “random 
walk model” or the “unit root model”, which is used in the literature to accommodate earnings 
shocks that might have permanent effects: (MaCurdy, 1982; Abowd and Card, 1989; Moffitt and 
Gottschalk, 1995; Dickens, 2000; Wilke, 2005; Sologon and O'Donoghue, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c).  
2
, 1 , 1 , (0, ), ( , ) 0 ia i a ia ia i a ia u u iid E u π π π σ π − − = + = ∼           (6) 
Equation (6) specifies the random walk process, where the current value depends on the one 
from  the  previous  age  and  an  innovation  term  ia π ,  which  represent  white-noise  non-mean-11 
 
reverting shocks to permanent earnings. In other words,  ia π  accommodates any permanent re-
ranking of individuals in the earnings distribution. As argued by Baker (1997), the intuition for 
this model is not obvious, but the high persistency of the unit root model might result from low 
rates of depreciation of human capital investments or labour market conditions through implicit 
contacts. In this model, current earnings are a sufficient statistic for future earnings. Most studies 
forced  the  innovation  variance  to  be  lifecycle  invariant,  except  for  Gustavsson  (2004b)  and 
Dickens (2000b).  
Thirdly, regarding the transitory component of earnings, previous research has brought evidence 
that transitory earnings might be serially correlated. Therefore, a more general autocorrelation 
structure is called for, that relaxes the restriction on  ' it v s  from the canonical model. For the 
construction  of  such  a  structure,  longitudinal  studies  on  earnings  dynamics  turned  to  error 
processes from the literature on time series analysis. Based on MaCurdy (1982), the structure of 




, (0, ), (0, )
p q
j it j j it j it i c
j j
v iid v ε ρ θ ε ε σ σ − −
= =
= ∑ ∑ ∼ ∼ ,  (7) 
it ε  is assumed to be white noise with mean 0 and variance 
2
ε σ . The variance 
2
0,c σ   measures the 
volatility  of  shocks  at  the  start  of  the  sample  period  and 
2
ε σ   the  volatility  of  shocks  in 
subsequent  years.  j ρ   is  the  autoregressive  parameter  with  0 1 ρ = ,  which  measures  the 
persistence of shocks.  j θ  is the moving average parameter with  0 1 θ = , which accommodates 
sharp drops of the lag-j autocovariance compared with the other autocovariances. In this model, 
the  autoregressive  and  moving  average  parameters  are  assumed  to  be  constant  over  time. 
Additionally, some studies have found that the variance of the transitory shocks, 
2
ε σ , varies over 
the lifecycle and incorporated a polynomial  in age in the transitory component. (Backer and 
Solon, 2003; Gustavson, 2004b) 
3.2. Earnings Mobility 
Another aspect relevant for the evolution of earnings differentials is earnings mobility, defined 
by  Katz  and  Autor  (1999)  as  the  rate  at  which  individuals  shift  positions  in  the  earnings 
distribution.  Earnings  mobility  is  closely  related  to  the  importance  of  the  permanent  and 12 
 
transitory components in earnings variation. A large contribution of the permanent component 
implies that individual earnings are highly correlated over time and individuals do not change 
their income position to a large extent experiencing low rates of earnings mobility. Therefore, the 
changes in earnings mobility are determined by the extent to which changes in cross-sectional 
inequality are driven by changes in the permanent or transitory variance.  
Earnings mobility is a very complex phenomenon, and the ways of measuring it are diverse. We 
look  at  the  degree  of  immobility,  measured  by  the  ratio  between  permanent  and  transitory 
inequality, following Kalwij and Alessie (2003). This measure offers also a summary of the 
evolution in the structure of inequality: a(n) decrease (increase) in the immobility ratio indicates 
an  increase  (decrease)  in  earnings  mobility,  equivalent  with  a(n)  decrease  (increase)  in  the 
relative share of permanent differentials in the overall inequality. This mobility index captures 
non-directional earnings movements and can be interpreted as the opportunity to improve one’s 
position in the distribution of lifetime earnings.  
An  increase  in  cross-sectional  inequality  accompanied  by  a  decrease  in  earnings  mobility  is 
expected to have negative implications for long-run or lifetime earnings differentials, as it shows 
that over time low wage men get worse off both in terms of their relative earnings position and in 
terms of their opportunity to escape low wage trap. Thus it is reasonable to expect that cross-
sectional earnings differentials will be enhanced in a lifetime perspective.  
An increase in cross-sectional inequality accompanied by an increase in earnings mobility has 
uncertain implications for long-run or lifetime earnings differentials. Over time low wage men 
get worse off in terms of their relative earnings position, but better off in terms of the opportunity 
to escape low wage trap in a lifetime perspective. Thus earnings mobility could either enhance or 
decrease lifetime earnings differentials compared with the cross-sectional ones. 
A  decrease  in  cross-sectional  inequality  accompanied  by  an  increase  in  earnings  mobility  is 
expected to have positive implications for lifetime earnings differentials, as over time low wage 
men better their relative earnings position and their opportunity to escape low wage trap in a 
lifetime perspective. Thus, lifetime earnings differentials are expected to be reduced compared 
with annual differentials. 
A decrease in cross-sectional inequality accompanied by a decrease in earnings mobility has 
uncertain implications for lifetime earnings differentials, as over time low wage men get better 13 
 
off in terms of their relative earnings position, but worse off in terms of their opportunity to 
escape low wage trap in a lifetime perspective. Thus, lifetime earnings differentials could be 
either reduced or enhanced compared with annual differentials. 
It becomes obvious that the question regarding the link between earnings mobility and earnings 
inequality does  not have  a straight  forward answer and  mobility  is  not always  beneficial. It 
depends on the underlying factors: “changes in earnings mobility could either work to offset or 
to increase changes in cross-sectional dispersion”, with very different implications for permanent 
earnings inequality. Dickens (1999) Nonetheless, no controversy surrounds the fact that mobility 
is beneficial when it helps low paid individuals to improve their income position in the long-term 
or lifetime income distribution.  
4.  DATA 
The study is conducted using the administrative input data file on the professional career coming 
from the Social Security Institutions in Luxembourg. In Luxembourg each person with a gainful 
occupation must be affiliated to the social security system in the beginning of his professional 
career. The file contains detailed information on the professional career characteristics such as 
gross annual labour income, months, days or hours worked per year, occupational status, over the 
period 1950 and 2004. Important limitations of this file are that income from property is not 
recorded, wage income is known up to 4 times the minimum wage until 1991, and 5 thereafter, 
and white collars’ hours or days worked per year before 1988 are missing.  
The chosen measure of earnings is real log gross hourly wage. Hourly wage is computed by 
dividing  the  capped  gross  annual  income
2  by  the  total  number  of  hours  worked.  Given  the 
missing information for white collars’ hours of work prior to 1988, the study is restricted to 17 
years of panel: 1988-2004. The monetary values recorded in the data set are at the "nombre 
indice 100" (price index) and at the wage level of 1984. In order to get these values at the price 
and wage level of 2004 they are multiplied by 6.2463 * 1.337
3. Overtime hours and multiple jobs 
are disregarded from the analysis, therefore the total number of hours worked is capped at 12 
multiplied by 173 for white collars and 176 for the rest. The values of hourly wage below the 
                                                              
2 Capped annual income was computed based on the capped monthly wage.  
3 n.i. 2004: 624.63, wage level +33,7% 14 
 
minimum wage are set to the minimum wage
4. Individuals with gross hourly wage above 100 
Euro at 2004 level or who worked less than 1 hour per year are excluded from the analysis.  
To  avoid  biases  several  filters  are  applied.  Following  the  tradition  of  previous  studies,  the 
analysis focuses only on men to avoid the problem of selection bias characterising women’s 
earnings. We choose individuals born between 1940 and 1975, with ages between 20 and 57, 
recorded working at least once during 1988 and 2004. Individuals that experienced at least five 
years of inactivity gaps because of disability or who retired before the age of 57 with a disability 
benefit are dropped from the analysis.  
The resulting sample is an unbalanced panel, consisting of 270240 men. The individuals are 
allowed to exit and (re)enter the panel. The choice of using unbalanced panels for estimating the 
covariance structure of earnings is motivated by the need to mitigate the potential overestimation 
of earnings persistence that would arise from balanced panels where the estimation is based only 
on people that have positive earnings for the entire sample period.  
For the empirical analysis, individuals are categorized into 36 birth cohorts formed from men 
born in a particular year, with ages between 20 and 57. We selected only cohorts observed for at 
least  10  years  over  the  period  1988-2004,  which  allows  exploring  the  earnings  covariance 
structure for individuals of the same age, followed through time. Table 1 offers an overview of 
the sample size, the years observed and age range for each cohort. The evolution of the variance 
and mean of log hourly earnings is captured in Figure 4, which reports an increase earnings 
inequality and economic growth over the sample period. The evolution of the variance and mean 
earnings records a jump between 1991 and 1992. This jump is partially artificial because of a 
change in legislation: before 1992 the threshold for reporting wage was 4 times the minimum 
wage  and  5  times  thereafter.  The  highest  jump  in  the  evolution  of  mean  wage  is  observed 
between 1998 and 1999
5, which is most probably due to the increase of 8% in the gross wage of 
civil servants as a measure to finance social contributions. Around the same time a small increase 
is observed also in the variance of earnings. 
                                                              
4 The number of hours is recalculated accordingly. 
5 1999 marks also the year when there was a change in the pension law for civil servants, and as 
a consequence some civil servants were included in the sample only starting with 1999. This 
effect is seems to affect the most the oldest cohorts.  15 
 
The Luxembourgish labour market went through structural changes which started at the end of 
the 1980’s and intensified after 1995, resulting in a large increase in the active population after 
1988.  We  present  an  overview  of  the  sample  following  these  structural  changes.  First,  the 
number of active men more than doubled in 2004 compared with 1988, reaching a value of 
160,315 in 2004. Second, the evolution of the composite of the sample
6 by occupation status and 
sector (Figure 5 and Figure 6) resembles the one for the whole population illustrated in Figure 1 
and Figure 2: there is a clear shift in the structure, with white collars and civil servants, and the 
tertiary sector recording a significant increase in their share over time. Thirdly, as illustrated in 
Figure 7, the evolution of the composite of the sample by age is affected slightly by the filters 
applied, but maintains similar characteristics as the whole population (Figure 3). 
 
 
                                                              
6 Provided upon request from the author 16 
 
5.  ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION METHOD OF COVARIANCE STRUCTURES  
The aim of this section is to fit a parsimonious model to the autocovariance structure of earnings 
for  all  cohorts.  This  model  is  use  to  explore  the  changes  in  the  permanent  and  transitory 
components of earnings over the sample period and their impact on overall earnings inequality.  
5.1.Econometric Earnings Specification 
In  order to  differentiate  lifecycle  dynamics  from  secular  changes  in  earnings  inequality,  the 
earnings differentials are analysed within the 36 cohorts defined in the previous section. The first 
step is to de-trend earnings for each cohort. The empirical specification of earnings follows the 
structure:  
, 1,..., , 1,..., ict ct ict i c Y Y r t T i N = + = =   (8) 
where  ict Y  is the natural logarithm of real hourly earnings of the i-th individual, from the c-th 
cohort  in  the  t-th  year,  ct Y is  the  year-cohort  specific  mean  and  ict r   is  an  error term  which 
represents the individual-specific deviation from the year-cohort specific mean. The demeaned 
earnings  ict r  are assumed to be independently distributed across individuals, but autocorrelated 
over  time.  Earnings  differentials  within  each  cohort  can  be  characterised  by  modelling  the 
covariance structure of individual earnings  0 ( ) ( , ), 0,..., ict ict ict s c c VarCov Y E r r s T t − = = − .
7 
This  study  approaches  the  problem  of  choosing  a  longitudinal  process  for  the  demeaned 
earnings, ict r  following the methodology used by MaCurdy(1981) and MaCurdy (1982), meaning 
in a similar manner with time series. The inspection of the covariance structure of earnings, 
which is presented in the following section, suggests the following features of the data:  
(i)  the elements of the autocovariance structure decrease with the lag at a decreasing rate 
and  
(ii)  they converge gradually at a positive level
8;  
(iii)  the  lag-1  autocovariance  drops  to  a  larger  extent  compared  with  higher  order 
autocovariances, which decline more gradually;  
                                                              
7  c T and  0c t represent the total number of years and the first year observed for each cohort. 
8 convergence with increasing lags 17 
 
(iv)  the autocovariances and mean earnings vary over the sample period, so they cannot 
be assumed to be stationary over sample period;  
(v)  the autocovariances vary with age controlling for the period effect, hence they cannot 
be assumed to be stationary over the life cycle;  
(vi)  the variance covariance structure appears to be cohort specific. 
Feature (i) suggests the presence of an AR(1) process, but the presence of feature (iii) calls for a 
more  complex  ARMA  (1,  1)  or  ARMA(1,  2)  process.  Feature  (ii)  can  be  captured  by  the 
presence of the permanent component. Feature (vi) is captured by incorporating period specific 
parameters, meaning that the permanent individual component and the transitory component of 
earnings are allowed to vary with time. The life cycle non-stationarity of the autocovariance 
structure of earnings mentioned in feature (v) is captured by modelling the permanent individual 
component as random walk and/or random growth in age. Cohort heterogeneity is incorporate by 
parameters  that  allow  the  permanent  and  transitory  components  to  vary  between  cohorts. 
Additionally, unlike most studies, we allow for age-specific innovation variance and age-related 
heteroskedasticity in the transitory shocks.  
We  started  with  a  general  model  specification  that  encompasses  all  the  relevant  aspects  of 
earnings  dynamics  considered  above.  We  employed  preliminary  data  analysis  procedures  to 
choose among competing specifications in order to avoid choosing a model which is broadly 
inconsistent with the data. After much experimentation, the following general specification of 
equation (4) is found to best fit the data. 
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We refer to the model in equation (9)-(12) as our “base model”. According to equation (9), 
earnings can be decomposed into a permanent component  1 1 c t iat u γ λ  and a transitory component 
2 2 c t it v γ λ .  The  permanent  component  iat u   (Equation  (10))  specifies  a  random  walk  in  age  in 
earnings growth after age 20 up to age 40, where 
2 ~ (0, )
a ia iid π π σ  is the innovation at each age, 
and after that a random effects model with the distribution of the effects fixed at that implied by 
the random walk. Previous research forced the innovation variance 
2
a π σ  to be the same over the 
lifecycle. Our rich data allowed us to estimate age specific innovation variances. The model with 
age-specific innovation variances until the age of 40 was found to fit the data the best. This 
decision is backed up also by Figure 9. We also estimate the variance of an initial permanent 
shock (assumed to be at age 20, which is also the lowest age observed in our dataset), denoted 
20
2
u σ . Thus the permanent earnings variance within a cohort rises with age up until age 40, after 
which it remains at its current level. Consistent with many matching and human capital models, 
whereby human capital or ability is revealed for the first 20 years of labour market experience 
after which the permanent differentials start shrinking, We expect larger permanent shocks at 
younger age. (Jovanovic, 1979) 
Equation (11) specifies the transitory component of earnings which evolves as an ARMA(1,1) 
process, where the serial correlation  ρ parameter captures the decreasing rate of decay of the 
covariances with the lag, the moving-average parameter θ  captures the sharp drop of the lag-1 
autocovariance compared with the other autocovariances, and  it ε  are white-noise mean-reverting 
transitory shocks. The variance 
2
0,c σ   measures the volatility of shocks at the start of the sample 
period, 
2
t ε σ   the  volatility  of  shocks  in  subsequent  years  and    the  persistence  of  shocks. 
Measurement error in this model is captured by this transitory component. Additionally, equation 
(12) allows the variance of  it ε  to change over the lifecycle, as a polynomial of order 4 in age.  
The non-stationary pattern of earnings is accommodated using time specific loading factors, both 
on the permanent and transitory component of earnings,  , 1,2; 0,16 kt k t λ = = , normalized to 1 in the first 19 
 
wave for identification
9. Cohort heterogeneity is accommodated by allowing both the permanent 
and the transitory component to vary with the cohort.  , 1,2 jc j γ =  are cohort loading factor, 
normalized to 1 for the cohort born in 1945 for identification. 
5.2. Specification of the Covariance Structure of Earnings  
When  working  with  ARMA(p,q)  processes  in  the  context  of  panel  data,  MaCurdy  (1981), 
MaCurdy (1982) and Anderson and Hsiao (1982) underlined the need for a treatment of initial 
conditions
10.  As  illustrated  in  equations  (14)  and  (15),  the  autoregressive  process  induces  a 
recursive structure in the moments: the variance-covariance in year t depends on the transitory 
variance-covariance in year t-1. If one tracks the recursion back to the first sample year for each 
cohort, this raises the question of what is the transitory variance for each cohort in that year. In 
the earlier stage of the literature on earnings dynamics, it was common to restrict the initial 
transitory  variance to be the same  for all  cohorts. In  line with the  most recent  literature on 
earnings  dynamics,  our  model  acknowledges  that  earnings  volatility  varies  across  cohorts 
because they illustrate different stages of the lifecycle and they have experienced different period 
effects. Therefore such a strong assumption is untenable.  
Following MaCurdy (1981), MaCurdy (1982), we treat the initial transitory variances of the 36 
cohorts as 36 additional parameters to be estimated. The covariance structure for the first sample 
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The covariance structure for subsequent years can be expressed as follows: 
                                                              
91994 refers to t=0 
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5.3.Estimation of Covariance Structures 
Covariance  structures  are  models  that  specify  a  structure  for  the  covariance  matrix  of  the 
regression error. They can be used to model structures for error dynamics and  measurement 
error. The  goal  is  to  estimate  the  parameters  of  the  covariance  structure of  earnings  for  all 
cohorts. This can be used to analyse the changes in the permanent and transitory components of 
earnings over the sample period.  
The parameters of the models are fit to the covariance structure for each cohort using equally 
weighted minimum distance methods of estimation. The methodology used is the same as that 
utilized  by  Cappellari  (2003),  Baker  and  Solon  (2003),  Ramos  (2003),  Kalwij  and  Alessie 21 
 
(2003), Dickens (2000), Baker (1997), Abowd and Card (1989), Cervini and Ramos (2006), 
Sologon and O’Donoghue (2009a, 2009b, 2009c).  
Following Sologon and O’Donoghue (2009a, 2009b, 2009c), for each cohort  and individual  , ,, , 


















where  ict d  is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the individual from cohort c is present in 
year t of the panel and  c t is the total length of the panel for each cohort. Similarly, the vector 

















where  ict r  are the earnings residuals for individual i belonging to cohort c  in year t in mean 
deviation form for each cohort and year. The elements of the  ic R  corresponding to missing years 
are set to 0. The variance-covariance matrix of the earnings is computed separately for each 
cohort, c C .  The  elements  of  the  variance-covariance  matrix  for  cohort  c,  c C ,  which  is  of 


















where  c n  is the total number of individuals in cohort c,  , {1,..., } c k l t = . Conformably with  c m , 
ci m   represent  the  distinct  elements  of  the  individual  cross-product  matrix 
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×   which  stacks  all  the  elements  of  the  variance  covariance 
matrix  c C   for  cohort  c.  The  aggregate  vector  of  moments  for  all  cohorts  is  denoted  by: 
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× = × ∑ . In this paper, N=4668.  
To estimate the error components of the structural model illustrated by equations (9), (10) and 
(11), the elements of m are fit to a parameter vector θ, so that       ( ) f = m θ ,  ( ) f θ  takes the form 
of equations (14), (15), (16) and (13). Minimum distance estimation requires minimising the 
weighted sum of the squared distance between the actual covariances (m) and a function of the 
parameter  vector  ( ( ) f θ )  which  encapsulates  the  covariance  structure  implied  by  the  error 
component  model.  Therefore,  minimum  distance  estimation  involves  the  following  quadratic 
form: ( ) [ ( )] [ ( )]' D f f = − − θ m θ W m θ ,  where  W is  a  positive  definite  weighting  matrix. 
Minimum distance estimator chooses  ɵ θ to minimise the distance function  ɵ ( ) D θ . 
Based on Chamberlain (1984), the asymptotic optimal choice of  W  is the inverse of a matrix 
that consistently estimates the covariance matrix of  m, which leads to the optimum minimum 
distance estimator (OMD). However, Clark (1996) and Altonji and Segal (1994) provided Monte 
Carlo evidence that OMD is biased in small samples because of the correlation between the 
measurement error in the second moments and forth moments. Instead, they proposed using the 
identity matrix as a weighting matrix. This approach, often called “equally weighted minimum 
distance estimation” (EWMD), involves using the standard nonlinear least squares to fit  ( ) f θ  to
m. The same procedure is followed in this paper.  
For estimating the asymptotic standard errors of the parameter estimates, we apply the delta 
method.  Following  Chamberlain  (1984),  the  asymptotic  variance-covariance  matrix  of  the 
estimated parameters is obtained from the following formula: 
-1 -1 AsyVar(θ) = (G'WG) G' ' WVWG(G WG)             (18) 23 
 
where  G   is  the  Jacobian  of  the  transformation  ( ) f θ   evaluated  at  ɵ = θ θ.  G   has  dimension 




c c t t +
×  and p is the number of 
parameters. W  is the identity matrix and V the matrix of fourth sample moments.  
Chamberlain  (1984)  showed  that  under  some  fairly  general  regularity  assumptions,  the 
independence of  ic R  implies that the sample mean of  ci m  has an asymptotic normal distribution 
* * ( , ) c c c m N m V ∼ , where 
*
c m  is the expectation of  ci m , meaning the true covariance matrix of 
earnings, and 
*
c V   is the  variance-covariance  matrix, which can  be estimated consistently  by 
computing the sample moment matrix of the  c Vech(C ) vector,  c V . The elements of the variance 
covariance  c V  can be written as follows: 
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The variance-covariance matrix of m was denoted by  V , where  V is the block diagonal matrix 
which is constructed from all the  c V  matrices.  
5.4. Strategy for model specification 
The strategy for model specification follows Sologon and O’Donoghue (2009a, 2009b, 2009c). 
The chi-squared goodness of fit statistic is computed following Newey(1985):  
ɵ ɵ [ ( )] [ ( )]' f f χ = − −
-1 m θ R m θ  











− = − ∑ ,  =
-1 -1 R (WVW')   and 
-1 W = I -G(G AG) ' G'A .  The  majority  of  the 
existing  studies  estimating  the  covariance  structure  of  earnings  used  this  general  form  of 
specification test to assess the goodness of fit of the model. However, in most cases, all models 
have been rejected. Baker and Solon (2003), Baker (1997), Leamer (1983) criticized these type 24 
 
of tests for several reasons. First, Baker and Solon (2003) and Leamer (1983) underlined that 
“diagnostic tests such as goodness-of-fit tests, without explicit alternative hypothesis, are useless, 
since if the sample size is large enough, any maintained hypothesis will be rejected. Such tests 
therefore degenerate into elaborate rituals for measuring the effective sample size.” Second, as 
pointed by Baker and Solon (2003), an additional problem is that these specification tests have 
inflated  size  in  small  samples  and  the  inflation  is  positively  related  with  the  number  of 
overidentifying restrictions. For example, Baker (1997) revealed through a Monte Carlo study, 
that for a test with fewer than 150 overidentifying restrictions, the critical values are 40%-50% 
greater than the critical values based on the asymptotic theory. Therefore, we decided to report 
this statistic as a reference, but not to use it to assess the goodness of fit of our model. Instead we 
employed the SSR as a measure of fit. 
To test between nested models, we could use Preposition 3’ in Chamberlain (1984) or the LR 
test. Based on Preposition 3’ in Chamberlain (1984), assuming that the general model has p 
parameters, to test between two nested models, one in which  1 k  parameters are restricted to 0 (
1 p k χ − ) and one in which 2 k
11 parameters are restricted to 0 (
2 p k χ − ), Chamberlain (1984) showed 
that the incremental chi square statistic 
1 2 p k p k χ χ χ − − = −  follows a chi-squared distribution with      






= . Under the 
null  hypothesis,  LR  is  follows  a  chi-square  distribution  with  d.o.f  equal  to  the  number  of 
restrictions  1 2 k k − . To test between non-nested model, we use the BIC and the AIC criterion.  
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The smaller the value of BIC and AIC are the better the fit is. The difference between the two is 
that BIC incorporates a higher penalty for additional parameters than AIC and is recommended 
as the first choice.  
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6.  THE DYNAMIC AUTOCOVARIANCE STRUCTURE OF HOURLY EARNINGS 
To begin with, it is informative to have a description of the dynamic structure of individual log 
hourly earnings. The autocovariance structure of earnings is computed for each cohort, adding up 
to 4668 sample  moments. The autocovariance structure by cohorts is displayed  in  Figure 8. 
Based  on  these  trends  we  establish  the  main  characteristics  of  the  model  aimed  to  fit  the 
autocovariance structure of earnings for all cohorts. 
In all countries, the autocovariances display different patterns across cohorts, supporting the 
hypothesis of cohort heterogeneity with respect to individual earnings dynamics. The general 
picture reveals that the variance of log hourly earnings increased for all cohorts between 1988 
and 2004,  but the rate of  increase and the  magnitude differs  among cohorts. Similarly  with 
Dickens’  (2000b)  results  for  UK,  the  younger  the  cohort  the  faster  the  rise  in  the 
autocovariances.  The  absolute  magnitude  of  the  autocovariance  structure  appears  to  have  a 
hump-shaped pattern: the lowest values are recorded by the youngest cohorts, followed by the 
oldest cohorts and lastly by the middle-age cohorts.  
For all cohorts, all lags autocovariances show a similar pattern as the variance. They are positive 
and evolve parallel with the variance. The distance between autocovariances at consecutive lags 
falls at a decreasing rate. The biggest fall is registered by the lag-1 autocovariance, after which 
the  covariances  appear  to  converge  gradually  at  a  positive  level.  Variances  reflect  both  the 
permanent and the transitory components of earnings, whereas higher order covariances reflect 
the permanent component of earnings. Therefore, for all cohorts, the evolution of covariances, at 
all orders, suggests the presence of a permanent individual component of wages and a transitory 
component which is serially correlated. In addition, the magnitude of the longer lag covariances 
relative to the variances is higher the older the cohort.  
One possible explanation for these trends is given by the theory on matching models, which 
sustains that the more experience an individual accumulates, the more information is revealed on 
the individual’s ability. (Jovanovic, 1979) Therefore, permanent wage dispersion and implicitly 
overall inequality within a cohort is expected to rise as the cohort ages. 
To look at the life cycle effects more clearly it is necessary to control for the period effect which 
is present in the within-cohort covariances. Thus we keep year constant and illustrate the life 26 
 
cycle autocovariances by age. Figure 9 presents the variance-covariance structure by age for the 
selected years.  
All lags autocovariances of log real gross hourly earnings show a similar pattern as the variance. 
They are positive and evolve parallel with the variance, at different rates over the life cycle. They 
rise sharply over the life cycle until the late 30s and early 40s, after which they have a rather 
stable evolution up until late 50s. The diminishing rate of increase of all lags autocovariances 
observed from the age of 20 until the late 50s is consistent with the presence of a permanent 
component of earnings that rises with age at a diminishing rate. (Dickens, 2000b)  
Comparing  across  years,  the  life  cycle  profile  of  the  auto-covariances  of  log  gross  hourly 
earnings  appears  to  become  steeper  over  time.  The  slope  of  the  life  cycle  profile  can  be 
interpreted as the returns to the permanent complement of earnings. Therefore, steeper slopes in 
later years imply increasing returns to the permanent component of earnings over time.  
To sum up, the description of the dynamic structure of individual earnings for men suggests five 
main features of the data, which were incorporated in our model, as mentioned previously: 
•  First, the covariance elements are not the same at all lags. They decrease with the lag at a 
decreasing  rate  and  converge  gradually  at  a  positive  level,  suggesting  the  presence  of  a 
transitory element, which is serially correlated, and of a permanent individual component of 
earnings.  
•  Second, as the autocovariances and mean earnings vary over the sample period, they cannot 
be assumed to be stationary over sample period. The stationarity assumption was tested and 
rejected using the methodology introduced by MaCurdy (1982).  
•  Third, as autocovariances  vary with age controlling  for the period effect, they cannot be 
assumed to be stationary over the life cycle.  
•  Lastly, the variance-covariance structure appears to be cohort specific.  27 
 
7.  RESULTS OF COVARIANCE STRUCTURE ESTIMATION 
7.1. Error component model estimation results 
To investigate these patterns more formally, we proceed to the GMM estimation of the earnings 
dynamics model described in Section 5. Table 2 shows the resulting estimates. The first three 
columns  show  the  parameter  estimates  and  the  associated  SE  estimates  for  the  base  model 
outlined in equations (9)-(12). All the parameter estimates are highly significant. Recall that this 
model incorporates a persistent component, composed of terms capturing a random walk after 
age 20 until age 40, with age-specific innovation variances, and a random effects model after age 
40 with the distribution of the effects fixed at that implied by the random walk, plus a transitory 
component  following  an  ARMA(1,1)  process  with  age-based  heteroskedastic  innovations. 
Furthermore, the persistent and transitory components are allowed to shift over time and over 
cohort by separate year-specific and cohort-specific factor loadings.  
The significant estimates of 
20
2
u σ  and 
2
a π σ , show that the variance of the initial permanent shock 
at  age  20  and  the  random  walk  with  age-specific  innovation  variances  until  age  40  play  a 
significant role in the formation of the persistent component. As each cohort ages, the permanent 
component  increases  by  the  innovation  variance, 
2
a π σ ,  which  records  the  highest  values  at 
younger ages and declines with age. The pattern of the permanent variance, holding time and 
cohort  shifters  constant  is  captured  in  Figure  10.  This  pattern  indicates  that  the  persistent 
inequality increases over the lifecycle, but at a diminishing rate. Hence, within a cohort, the 
persistent variance increases with age until age 40, remaining at the same level thereafter. The 
same result is also found by Dickens (2000b) for the UK between 1975 and 1995.  
Table  2  (base  model)  reports  next  the  estimates  of  the  year-specific  loading  factors  on  the 
persistent  component.  For  identification,  the  parameter  for  1988  is  normalized  to  1.  The 
estimated factor loadings are significant and above one in all years, except 1990. Their pattern is 
captured  in  Figure  11.  Except  for  the  slight  decrease  in  1990,  the  factor  loadings  increase 
between 1988 and 2004, suggesting that the returns to the systematic earnings components, such 
as education, ability, increased over time in Luxembourg. Thus the permanent component is 
expected to play a relative large role in the increase in earnings inequality over this period. This 28 
 
is consistent with the trend estimated by Sologon and O'Donoghue (2009a, 2009b, 2009c) for 
Luxebourg between 1995 and 2001.  
Next, Table 2 (base model) reports the cohort-specific factor loadings. For identification, the 
parameter for the cohort born in 1940 is normalized to 1. All parameters are significant and 
lower than 1. Their pattern is displayed in Figure 12: the permanent component plays a larger 
relative role in earnings differentials the older is the cohort. This is expected given that younger 
cohorts experience higher earnings volatility than older cohorts due to temporary contracts. The 
cohorts  born  between  1973  and  1975,  appear  to  have  a  higher  return  to  education  than  the 
cohorts born between 1967 and 1972. The overall trend is consistent with the trend estimated by 
Sologon  and  O'Donoghue  (2009b,  2009a,  2009c)  for  Luxembourg  between  1995  and  2001. 
Opposite trends are obtained by Gustavsson (2004a, 2004b) for Sweden.  
Further on, Table 2 (base model) reports the estimated parameters for the transitory component, 
which reveal that the initial cohort-specific variances, the ARMA(1,1) process, the age-based 
heteroskedactic  transitory  shocks  after  age  20,  the  time  and  cohort-specific  loading  factors 
contribute significantly to earnings volatility in Luxembourg.  
The  pattern  of  the  estimates  of  the  cohort-specific  initial  variances,  which  capture  the 
accumulation of the transitory process up to the start of the sample period for each cohort is 
illustrated in Figure 13: the older the cohort the higher the initial variance. The pattern evolves 
monotonically as a U-shape until the cohort born in 1948, and with spikes for the oldest cohort. 
The  estimated  initial  variances  for  the  cohorts  born  in  1968  through  1975  show  how  the 
accumulation of the transitory process changed for the 20-year-old over the period. The variance 
estimate more than doubled from 1988 (cohort 1968) to 1995 (cohort 1975), suggesting that 
dispersion has been increasing over time. A similar trend in the initial variances is obtained, for 
example, by Baker and Solon (2003) for Canada between 1976 and 1992. 
Next,  Table  2  (base  model)  shows  the  estimates  of  the  ARMA(1,1)  process.  The  large 
autoregressive parameter,    0.964 ρ = , suggests that shocks are persistent, and the negative sign of 
ɵ 0.206 θ= −  implies that the autocovariances decline sharply over the first period, confirming the 
trends observed in the description of the autocovariance structure of earnings. The estimates 
suggest that 75.8% of a transitory shock is still present after 1 year, and 0.9% is still present after 29 
 
17  years.  our  estimates  for the  ARMA(1,1)  process  are  similar  with  Dickens’s  (2000b)  and 
Gustavsson’s (2004a, 2004b) most comparable estimates for the UK and Sweden. 
Next
12, we turn to the parameters that allow for age-related heteroskedasticity in the transitory 
shocks. The sign of the parameter estimates is consistent with those obtained by Baker and Solon 
(2004) for Canada and Gustvason (2004a, 2004b) for Sweden. The estimates of the age quadratic 
function determine the pattern illustrated in Figure 14. There is an initial decline in the variances 
of the  innovations  in  early twenties,  followed  by  a  slow  increase until early  forties, and an 
accelerated  increase  thereafter.  This  pattern  points  to  the  importance  of  accounting  for  the 
systematic influence of age on the variance of the transitory earnings innovations.  
Finally,  we  report  the  estimates  of  the  period  and  cohort-specific  loading  factors  for  the 
transitory component. For identification, the factor loadings for 1988 and for the cohort born in 
1940 were normalized to unity. The pattern of the year-specific loading factors is captured in 
Figure 11, which illustrate a monotonic decrease over the period. Thus the relative share of the 
transitory component appears to decrease over the sample period. The divergence observed in the 
trends of the time factor loading of the two components (Figure 11), suggest that the structural 
labour market changes favoured a rise in the returns to skills over time and a decrease in earnings 
instability. 
Figure 12 captures the pattern of the cohort-specific loading factors for the transitory earnings, 
which  reveals  that  earnings  volatility  is  higher  for  younger  cohorts,  confirming  the  pattern 
observed  in  the  dynamic  description  of  the  autocovariance  structure  of  earnings,  where 
autocovariances were found to be lower for younger cohorts. This is expected, given the more 
frequent job changes and less stable earnings of younger workers. A similar trend was obtained 
by Sologon and O'Donoghue (2009a, 2009b, 2009c) for Luxembourg.  
Our base  model  nests and extends  most of the  specification used  in the US, Canadian, and 
European  studies.  The  studies  based  on  relatively  small-scale  panel  surveys  imposed  often 
economically implausible restrictions. We tested whether some of these restrictions hold in our 
data. The Wald test and the p- values for testing these restrictions are reported in Table 3. 
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Some studies assumed away the heterogeneity in earnings growth rates and/or the existence of 
earnings shocks with permanent effects. Backer and Solon (2003) and Ramos (2003) were able 
to incorporate both  in the permanent component. Our model,  however  incorporates only the 
random walk process, as a specification with both components leads to identification problems 
for two parameters of the random growth model.  
We extended the specification of the permanent component to follow a random walk process 
with  age-specific  innovation  variances  until  age  40,  and  a  random  effects  model  with  the 
distribution of the effects fixed at that implied by the random walk thereafter. These features 
were  incorporated only  by  Dickens  (2000b)  for the  UK.  Another  study  which  did  a  similar 
attempt is Gustavsson (2004b), but he constrained the innovation variance to be the same for two 
adjacent ages between 28 and 53.  
If we assume away the random walk until age 40 in the permanent component, the Wald test on 
this restrictions clearly rejects the null (χ
2
 = 10326.6302, df = 31). If we assume away the age-
specific innovation variance until age 40, keeping all the other specifications of the base model, 
the Wald test on this restrictions rejects the null (χ
2 = 2463.3344, df = 21) with a p-value equal to 
0.0001.  
Except Baker and Solon (2003) and Gustavsson (2004b), previous studies imposed the restriction 
of invariant variance of the transitory shocks, which was rejected by the Canadian and Swedish 
data.  Our  study  proves  once  again  that  assuming  away  the  presence  of  age-related 
heteroskedastic transitory  shocks,  meaning that  1 2 3 4 0, 0, 0, 0 β β β β = = = = ,  is statistically 
indefensible: the p-value for the Wald test is 0.0001, clearly rejecting the null hypothesis in the 
Luxembourgish data.  
In  order  to  see  the  implications  of  imposing  some  of  these  restrictions  on  the  inequality 
decomposition,  we  estimated  a  restricted  model,  where  the  permanent  component  follows  a 
standard random walk in age with the variance of the first period shock at age 20 fixed at 0, and 
the transitory component follows an ARMA(1,1) process with cohort-specific initial variances, 
with time and cohort loading factors on both components. The estimation results are displayed in 
Table 2, columns 4-6. 
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7.2. Inequality Decomposition into Permanent and Transitory Inequality 
We now use the parameters estimates from the error component models to decompose earnings 
inequality into permanent and transitory inequality, assess their absolute and relative contribution 
to the evolution of overall inequality and estimate earnings mobility over the sample period. In 
interpreting  the  findings  one  has  to  keep  in  mind  that  there  is  a  fundamental  conceptual 
underidentification of time, life-cycle, and cohort effects due to the exact multicollinearity of 
time, age, and birth year. Thus two effects will always be confounded. In order to provide a more 
comprehensive  picture,  we  perform  first  the  inequality  decomposition  by  cohort  over  time, 
second the decomposition of the cross-sectional age-inequality profile in four selected years, and 
third the inequality decomposition by selected age groups over time. 
7.2.1.  Inequality decomposition by cohort over time 
We  start  with  the  decompositions  by  cohort  over  time,  which  reveals  how  the  structure  of 
inequality and earnings mobility evolved between 1988 and 2004 for people born in each birth 
cohort  considered.  This  decomposition  enables  to  see  whether  the  labour  market  structural 
changes had a different impact depending on the birth year. This decomposition controls for the 
cohort effect, but confounds age and period effects.  
Absolute decomposition 
Figure 15 illustrates the absolute decomposition of the variance, together with the actual and 
predicted variance of earnings by cohort for the base model. The predicted variance follows 
closely the evolution of the actual variance, confirming the fit of the base model.  
In a longitudinal view, over the sample period, earnings differentials increased for all cohorts. 
Overall,  the  increase  in  cross-sectional  inequality  is  the  result  of  increasing  permanent 
differentials, trend consistent across cohorts. This finding is consistent with the results obtained 
by Sologon and O'Donoghue (2009b, 2009a, 2009c) for Luxembourg between 1995 and 2001. 
More heterogeneity is observed in the evolution of the transitory variance, which increased for 
the oldest cohorts 1940-1945 and for the youngest cohorts 1964-1975, and decreased for the rest. 
Thus the cohorts 1940-1945 experienced an increase in their earnings instability between ages 43 
(for the youngest) and 48 (for the oldest) until age 57. Similarly, earnings instability increased 32 
 
for cohorts 1964-1975 between early 20s until late 30s and 40s. For the middle cohorts, earnings 
instability decreased between age 25 and 57. 
The trends of the two components present some similarities across cohorts. For most cohorts 
permanent variance was lower than transitory variance in the beginning of the sample, and then 
surpassed it in 1993 for cohorts 1940-1963, in 1991 for cohorts 1964-1967, in 1992 for cohorts 
1968-1970, in 1995 for cohort 1971-1973, in 1996 for cohort 1974, and in 1997 for cohort 1975. 
Thus the structural change appears to affect the cohorts born in 1940-1943 around their 50s, the 
cohorts born between 1944-1953 around their 40s, the cohorts 1954-1962 around their 30s, the 
cohorts 1963-1965 around their late 20s, and finally the cohorts 1966-1975 around their early 
20s.  
Given  that  for  most  cohorts  the  changes  occur  around  mid  1990’s,  suggest  that  the  trends 
observed are not age effects, but the result of the changes in the structure of the labour market, 
which intensified beginning with early 1990’s. This explanation is sustained by the evolution of 
the  occupation  structure  for  each  cohort,  which  reveals  a  common  trend:  they  all  record  an 
increase in the share of the white collars and civil servants, accompanied by a reduction in the 
share of blue collars. Similarly, the share of the tertiary sector increases for all cohorts over time. 
Moreover, these trends are more pronounced for younger compared with older cohorts. 
13 
An explanation for the slightly delayed effect for the cohorts born 1971-1973, which record an 
intensification of their permanent differentials in 1995, meaning around age 22-23 could be the 
evolution in the education and in the occupation structure. Younger cohorts tend to spend longer 
time in education and thus highly educated men enter the labour market after the age of 22, 
exacerbating permanent differentials. This effect coupled with the evolution towards a service 
economy results in an increasing share of men entering the labour market as highly educated 
white collars and civil servants. Similarly, for the youngest two cohorts, the structural change 
kicks in two years after their entrance into the labour market, meaning at 22, when also highly 
educated men join the labour market, probably as white collars or civil servants. For example, 
looking at the cohort born in 1975, the share of people working in the financial sector doubled in 
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1997, and quadrupled in 2004 compared with 1995. Similarly, the share of white collars almost 
doubled in 1997 and more than tripled in 2004 compared with 1995.
 14 
Except for the youngest six cohorts, the persistent dispersion tends towards overall inequality 
during  the  last  years  of  the  panel  and  diverges  from  the  trend  of  the  transitory  component, 
suggesting a general diffusion of earnings persistence for mid-career (older than 35) and older 
workers. 
Following  these  trends,  the  contribution  of  the  two  components  to  the  growth  in  overall 
inequality  differs  across  periods  and  across  cohorts.  The  inequality  growth  until  1992  was 
determined by an increase in both components for the cohorts 1940 through 1965, and by an 
increase in the permanent component counteracted by a decrease in the transitory component for 
the other cohorts. The increase between 1992 and 1997 was due to the increase in the permanent 
component counteracted by the decrease in the transitory component for most cohorts, except the 
cohorts born in 1963 through 1970. For the rest of the sample period, the growth in inequality 
was due to an increase in earnings persistency accompanied by a decrease in earnings instability 
for the cohorts born in 1940 through 1968, and by an increase in both components for the cohorts 
born in 1969 through 1975.  
1997  appears  to  be  an  important  period  in  the  evolution  of  both  components,  marking  the 
moment  when  the  two  components  accentuated  their  fanning  out  pattern.  First,  permanent 
dispersion intensified its increase for all cohorts. This is what we expect given the increasing 
shares of white collars and civil servants, which for the youngest cohorts is equivalent also to an 
increasing share of highly educated people. Second, the intensification of the structural changes 
appears to have decreased transitory dispersion for older workers and increased it for the young. 
This  might  be  linked  with  the  increased  ability  of  younger  workers  of  adapting  to the  new 
economy as opposed to older workers, first due to their higher level of education and second due 
to their availability for flexible work contracts. The reduction in the transitory component for 
older workers might signal their reduced ability of adapting to the new economy.  
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Relative decomposition 
In  order  to  assess  how  the  structure  of  inequality  evolved  over  time  for  each  cohort,  we 
computed the relative share of the two components in the overall predicted variance of earnings. 
Figure 16 illustrates the share of the two components over time by cohort.  
The  evolution  of  the  structure  of  inequality  reveals  common  and  diverging  patterns  across 
cohorts. First, all cohorts recorded an overall increase in the share of the permanent component. 
The evolution however was not monotonic. The cohorts born 1940 through 1959 have a similar 
pattern in the evolution of the share of the permanent inequality, which decreased until 1990 at a 
decreasing rate the younger the cohort, then increased at an increasing rate until 1993 - when 
they turned between 52 and 34 years old -, slowed down until 1997, accelerated its increase 
towards 1999 and slowed down towards 2004. For these cohorts, the share of the permanent 
component was between roughly 40%-60% in the beginning of the sample – when they were 
between 42 and 29 years old -, and 65%-75% in 2004 – when they were between 57 and 45 year 
old.  
For the cohorts born in 1960 through 1968 the share of the permanent component increased at a 
higher rate the younger the cohort until 1993, when they turned between 33 and 25 years old. 
Until 1997, the share increased for the cohorts 1960-1963 at a decreasing rate the younger the 
cohort,  remained  constant  for  the  cohort  1964  and  decreased  for  the  other  cohorts  at  an 
increasing rate the younger the cohort. After 1997, the share increased at a decreasing rate the 
younger the cohort, ranging between 15%-42% in 1988 – when they were between 28 and 20 
years old - to 65%-74% in 2004 – when they were between 44 and 36 years old -, with the 
highest rates belonging to the oldest cohorts.  
The youngest seven cohorts appear to have a different profile compared with the older cohorts, 
which  might  be  due  to the  stronger  age  effects  coupled  with  the  change  in  the  educational 
behaviour of younger cohorts and with the maturation of the labour market structural changes. 
Unlike the older cohorts where the changes  in the  structure of  inequality occurred around a 
specific year, e.g. 1993, the changes in the inequality structure for the youngest cohorts occur 
around specific ages. They start from lower values of the share of the permanent component 
compared with the older cohorts and record a sharp increase over the first 6 years of their career 
until they reach the age of 25, which is 1994 for the cohort born in 1969, 1995 for the cohort 35 
 
born in 1970 and 2000 for cohort born in 1974, surpassing the values recorded by the older 
cohorts.  Further,  they  decrease  sharply  until  they  reach  the  age  of  30  and  increase  slightly 
thereafter, with lower shares of the permanent component compared with the older cohorts.  
Earnings mobility 
What  are  the  implications  for  earnings  mobility  for  each  cohort  over  time?  The  answer  is 
summarized in Figure 17, which plots the yearly evolution in earnings immobility
15 by cohort. 
The  evolution  of  earnings  immobility  resembles  the  evolution  of  the  share  of  the  persistent 
component.  An  increase  in  the  profile  implies  a  decrease  in  earnings  mobility,  meaning  a 
decrease in the opportunity for low income men in a specific cohort to improve their position in 
the distribution of lifetime earnings.  
The overall picture is that for all cohorts mobility decreased over the sample period, meaning 
that low wage men in all cohorts find it more difficult at the end of the sample period to improve 
their income position in the distribution of lifetime earnings compared with the beginning of the 
sample period.  
The  evolution  was  not  monotonic.  Similar  with  the  structure  of  inequality,  the  immobility 
profiles differ considerably between the cohorts 1940-1968 and 1969-1975. The cohorts 1940 - 
1968 recorded a sharp increase in earnings immobility until 1993, followed by a positive trend 
for the cohorts 1940-1963 and a negative trend for the cohorts 1964-1968 until 1997, and by an 
increase thereafter. Given that the changes in mobility occur at the same time for all cohorts 
represents a strong clue that the changes in the economy are the main triggers. 
The youngest seven cohorts recorded an increase in earning immobility until age 25, followed by 
a  sharp  decrease  until  age  30  and  a  slight  increase  thereafter.  Unlike  previous  cohorts,  the 
profiles  of  the  youngest  seven  cohorts  shift  through  time,  with  the  main  changes  occurring 
around the same age, which indicate a strong age effect. Looking at the degree of immobility at 
age 25, the shift indicates an increasing immobility over time. At the end of the sample earnings 
mobility appears to be higher for younger cohorts compared with older cohorts. 
7.2.2.  Decomposition of the cross-sectional age-inequality profile 
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In  order  to  see  the  evolution  of  the  structure  of  inequality  and  earnings  mobility  over  the 
lifecycle, we reveal the profiles of the two components and earnings immobility by age in 1988, 
1993, 1998 and 2004. Here, the cohort and age effects are confounded.  
Absolute decomposition 
Figure 18 illustrates the lifecycle profile of the permanent (left) and transitory (right) variance. In 
a cross-sectional view, in all years, permanent variance increases with age at a decreasing rate, 
which is consistent with the evidence of lifecycle earnings divergence provided earlier, showing 
that older  cohorts  experience  a  higher  earnings  persistency  compared  with  younger  cohorts. 
Similar  results  are  found  by  Dickens  (2000)  and  Ramos  (1999,  2003)  for  UK,  Cervini  and 
Ramos  (2006)  for  Spain,  Capellari  (2003)  for  Italy,  and  Sologon  and  O'Donoghue  (2009b, 
2009a, 2009c) for 14 EU countries.  
The profile of the permanent component, however, changed over time. For people older than mid 
30s, the profile is higher the later the year, suggesting that the labour market structural changes 
and the increase in the educational attainment over time enhanced permanent differentials for 
these age groups. For men in their early 20s, permanent variance decreased slightly between 
1988  and  1993.  For  men  in  their  late  20s,  permanent  variance  increased  until  1993,  and 
decreased until  1998 to a higher  level than  in  1988. For  men  in their early 30s, permanent 
variance increased until 1998 and decreased until 2004. 
The transitory variance follows a similar inverted-U pattern over the lifecycle, but less steep than 
the permanent variance. The profile changed over time. In 1988, the transitory variance increased 
sharply until late 20s, and slightly until late 40s. In 1993 the profile increased sharply until mid 
30s,  then  slowed  down  until  mid  40s,  and  decreased  slightly  thereafter.  In  1998 the  profile 
increased sharply until mid 30s, and slightly thereafter. In 2004, the profile differentiates itself 
with a steep increase until early 30s, followed by a decrease around mid 30s and a slight increase 
thereafter. 
For men in their early 20s the transitory variance increased between 1988 and 1993. For men in 
their mid 20s the transitory variance decreased between 1988 and 1998. For people in their late 
20s  the  profiles  look  similar.  For  men  in  their  early  30s,  the  transitory  variance  increased 
between 1988 and 1993, decreased in 1998 and increased in 2004 to similar values as in 1993. 
For men older than mid 30s, the transitory variance increased until the 1990s, and decreased in 37 
 
2004  to  values  lower  than  in  1988.  Therefore  in  2004  compared  with  1988  we  observe  an 
increased transitory variance for men in their early 30s and a decreased transitory variance for 
older ages. Thus the maturation of the labour market brought a decrease in earnings instability. 
Overall, we conclude that, in Luxembourg, earnings variance increases over the lifecycle due to 
an increase in both components. The permanent component records a sharper increase than the 
transitory component, and its increase is enhanced over time. Thus the labour market structural 
changes  and  the  evolution  of  the  education  system  over  time  enhanced  the  increase  in  the 
persistent component over the lifecycle. 
Relative decomposition 
Further, Figure 19 illustrates the lifecycle evolution of the share of the permanent components in 
the overall  variance  in 1988, 1993, 1998 and 2004. The  lifecycle profile of the  structure of 
inequality reveals an increase in the share of the permanent component with age, in all years 
except 1998. 
Over time, following the labour market structural changes, the lifecycle profile changed. In 1988 
inequality became predominantly permanent (the share of the permanent component is higher 
than 50%) after mid 40s,  in 1993 after age 23, whereas  in  later years  it was predominantly 
persistent for the entire age profile.  
In 1988, the share of the persistent component increased sharply until mid 20s, stabilised until 
early  30s  and  intensified  its  increase  thereafter,  suggesting  a  higher  persistency  in  earnings 
inequality the older the cohort. In 1993, the profile changed: it increased sharply until mid 20s, 
decreased slightly towards mid 30s, stabilised until mid 40s and increased thereafter to values 
lower than  for  mid 20s. Thus  young cohorts appear to have a  higher persistency than older 
cohorts  and  middle  cohorts.  The  explanation  might  be  the  difference  in  the  educational 
attainment between cohorts and the higher return to skills in the new economy. A similar trend is 
observed in 1998. Therefore, years 1993-1998 reflect the transition period between an industrial 
to a service economy. In 2004 the profile looks quite different: the share decreased for early 30s, 
increased sharply until early 40s and decreased slightly thereafter. Thus in 2004, the middle and 
oldest cohort have the highest persistency.  38 
 
Looking across age groups over time, for men in their early-mid 20s, the share of the permanent 
component increased over time. For those in their late 20s the share increased between 1988 and 
1993, and decreased in 1998 to values above the ones in 1988. For men in their early 30s, the 
share  increased until 1998 and decreased  in 2004. For those older than 35, the share of the 
permanent component increased over time. 
Earnings mobility 
What are the  implications  for earnings  mobility? The  lifecycle  immobility profiles  for  years 
1988, 1993, 1998 and 2004 are illustrated in Figure 20. Overall, earnings immobility increases 
over the lifecycle in all years, except 1998. The trend in immobility follows closely the trend in 
the share of the permanent component. Thus, in 1988, earnings immobility was higher the older 
the age. In 1993 and 1998 immobility was the highest at younger ages, followed by mid career 
and older age. In 2004 immobility appears be the highest mid career, followed men in their 50s 
and their 30s. 
For  men  in  their  early-mid  20s,  immobility  increased  over  time.  For those  in  their  late  20, 
earnings immobility increased between 1988 and 1993, and decreased in 1998 to values above 
the ones  in 1988.  For  men  in their early 30s, earnings  immobility  increased until 1998 and 
decreased in 2004. For those older than 35, immobility increased over time. 
7.2.3.  Inequality decomposition by age-groups over time 
Finally, we perform the decomposition of inequality controlling for the age effect. This shows 
how the structure of inequality and earnings immobility evolved for people in a certain age group 
between 1988 and 2004 under the impact of the labour market structural changes. we follow 
Baker  and  Solon  (2003)  and  perform  the  decomposition  for  40  years  old  males,  which  is 
approximately the middle of the active career. The cohort and period effects are confounded, and 
the trend reveals the story for 40-year old men.  
The absolute and relative inequality decomposition for men aged 40 is illustrated in Figure 21, 
which contains also the actual and predicted variances for the 40-year old men, reconfirming the 
high fit of the base model. In moving from year to year, all parameters change according to the 
specific period and birth cohort.  39 
 
The first thing to note is the increase in total variance, which duplicates the pattern seen in Figure 
4.  Consistent  with  the  trends  observed  by  cohort, the  increase  in  the  overall  inequality  was 
determined  by an  increase  in permanent  inequality. Split  by sub-periods, the  increase  in the 
overall inequality between 1988 and 1992 was determined by an increase in both components, 
and  by  an  increase  in  the  permanent  variance  counteracted  by  a  decrease  in  the  transitory 
variance  thereafter.  Transitory  inequality  displays  more  variation  compared  with  permanent 
inequality, evolving opposite to it: three spikes are observed in 1990, 1992 and 1994, followed 
by a monotonic decrease thereafter.  
In 1988, the persistent component accounted for 46.5% of the inequality in hourly earnings. Its 
share decreased until 1990, increased until 1993 surpassing the transitory variance, decreased in 
1994 to roughly 50%, and increased thereafter reaching a value of over 70% in 2004. Thus, after 
1993, the permanent inequality had a dominant share in the overall inequality of men aged 40. 
We also performed the decomposition for ages 30 and 50.
16 The general trends are maintained, 
however  some  differences  are  noted.  For  age  50, the  evolution  of  the  two  components  was 
similar with age 40, except that for age 50 the share of the permanent component in the overall 
inequality was higher than for the transitory inequality for most of the period. The share of the 
permanent component increased from below 50% in 1990 to almost 70% in 2004. 
For age 30, the trends display more noise compared with age 40 and 50: except for 1988-1992 
and 2002, the persistent components dominated overall inequality. The share of the permanent 
component increased from around 40% in 1988 to over 56% 2004. The maximum persistency for 
the 30-year old was reached in 1996-1997, when the share of persistent inequality was of 60%. 
Overall, the incidence of the transitory component is higher for men aged 30 than for those aged 
40 and 50. 
Following the labour market structural changes, the ranking between these age groups in terms 
of earnings persistency changed, sign that the impact of these changes differed by age groups. In 
the  beginning  of  the  sample  period  the  highest  persistency  was  observed  for  men  aged  50, 
followed by those aged 40 and 30. In the middle of the sample period, the persistency became 
higher for men aged 30, followed by those aged 50 and 40. In 2004, earnings persistency was 
higher for age 40, followed by age 50 and age 30. 
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What are the implications for earnings mobility for these age groups over time? The answer is 
summarized in Figure 22, which plots the pattern in earnings immobility
17 for these age groups. 
Recall, an increase in the profile implies a decrease in earnings mobility, meaning a decrease in 
the opportunity  for low  income  men to improve their position  in the distribution of  lifetime 
earnings.  
Overall, the immobility ratio increased over the sample period, signalling decreasing earnings 
mobility for all age groups over the sample period. The immobility profiles over time, however, 
appear to differ by age groups, sign that the labour market structural changes influenced younger 
workers differently from older workers.  
Men aged 40 and 50 exhibit similar profiles, with men aged 40 being more immobile than men 
aged 50 after 1996
18. A turning point is observed in 1997, when both profiles intensified their 
increase until 2003, followed by a drop in immobility in 2004.  
A  noisier trend  is observed  for  men  aged 30,  for whom  immobility  follows a  hump-shaped 
pattern: men aged 30 appear to be more mobile than men aged 40 and 50 over the period 1988-
1991 and after 1997. 1997 appears to be a turning point also for the immobility profile of men 
aged 30, which record a sharp drop in  immobility until 2002,  followed  by a  sharp  increase 
thereafter. Thus the factors that determined a decrease in mobility for people aged 40 and 50 
after 1997, determined an increase in mobility for people aged 30. 
For comparison and to complete the picture of the impact of the labour market structural changes 
on earnings mobility for all age groups, we added the immobility profiles for ages 5 years apart, 
ranging  from  20  to  55,  displayed  in  Figure  23.  The  profile  for  age  20  records  a  slightly 
increasing trend over the sample period, being consistently lower than all other profiles. This 
suggests that the youngest group is the most mobile and the increase in immobility was much 
smaller compared with the other age groups. The profiles for ages 21 and 22, not shown in 
Figure 23
19, evolve parallel with age 20, showing a lower mobility the older the age.  
The profile for age 25 is quite surprising. Starting from slightly higher values than age 30 in 
1988, it records the largest increase until 1993, then a slight decrease until 1997 followed by a 
                                                              
17 Immobility = permanent variance/transitory variance 
18 Except 2001 
19 Provided upon request from the author. 41 
 
sharp increase until 2000, surpassing the immobility ratios of all other profiles over the period 
1991-2000. Thus the labour market structural changes increased earnings immobility for men 
aged 25 to a much larger extent compared with other age groups. 
The profiles for ages 23-24, not shown in Figure 23
20, evolve similar with age 25, but shifted 
backwards with 2 and 1 year. Thus immobility increased until 1996 for age 24, and 1995 for age 
23, at a lower rate compared with age 25, and intensified their increase thereafter. Overall, for 
age range 20-25, earnings mobility is higher the younger the age.  
The profiles for ages 26-29, not shown in Figure 23
21, illustrate transition immobility profiles 
between age 25 and 30: they record a similar trend slightly lower the older the age until 1993, 
followed by a decrease, steeper and lasting one year longer the older the age, and finally a sharp 
increase parallel with the trend observed for age 25. Basically the profiles for ages 26-29 look 
like the profile for age 25, lower the older the age, with a decrease after 1997 longer with one 
year the further we move from age 25, followed by a similar parallel increase thereafter.  
The profiles for ages 31-39 represent a transition from the profile for age 30 to the profile for age 
40: they evolve similar to age 30 recording lower values than the profile for age 30 until 1997, 
and surpassing it thereafter, at an increasing rate the younger the cohort. Similar with the profile 
for age 30, they start decreasing towards the end of the sample one year later for each age group, 
at a decreasing rate the older the age. Thus from age 30, the trends for each age group converges 
towards the profile for age 40.  
The profiles for ages 41-49 behave similar to the profile for age 40. The profiles for ages 51-57 
behave similar to the profile for age 50. Overall, the immobility around 40s is slightly higher 
than for 50s.  
Thus these trends confirm the hump-shaped immobility profile observed in Figure 20. 
In order to see whether the estimated changes over the sample period are likely to be due to real 
changes in the functioning of the labour market rather than to short term fluctuations in the 
business cycle, we follow Baker and Solon (2003) and apply least squares to estimate time-series 
regressions of the persistent and transitory components and earnings immobility on a linear trend 
                                                              
20 Provided upon request. 
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and a variable that captures the business cycle – the growth rate in real GDP
22. The results are 
reported in Table 3.  
The point estimates indicate a strongly significant positive trend for the permanent component 
and  earnings  immobility,  and  a  less  strong  significant  negative  trend  for  the  transitory 
component.  Thus  permanent  variance  contributes  positively  to the  upward  trend  in  earnings 
inequality,  whereas  the  transitory  variance  counteracts  with  the  increase  in  the  permanent 
component. The insignificant coefficient estimates of the GDP growth rate for the permanent 
component and the immobility index indicate that the permanent variance and earnings mobility 
are insensitive to the business cycle. Hence, the estimated changes in the persistent components 
and earnings immobility between 1988 and 2004 are due to changes in the functioning of the 
labour market. The estimated coefficient of the GDP growth rate for the transitory component 
indicates a significant cyclical sensitivity in the transitory variance.  
To conclude, the changes that occurred in the labour market in this period intensified permanent 
differentials and decreased transitory differentials among men, thus decreasing their earnings 
mobility in a lifetime perspective.  
As a last step we look at the implications of estimating the restricted model displayed in Table 2. 
This model assumes away age-specific innovation variances and age-related heteroskedasticity in 
the transitory shocks. The decomposition implied by the restricted model for men aged 40 is 
revealed in Figure 24. 
Here  are  some  major  differences  between  Figure  21  and  Figure  24.  Unlike  Figure  21,  the 
restricted model predicts an absolute increase in both components over the sample period, with 
the permanent component increasing more than the transitory component. Moreover, except the 
beginning and the end of the sample period, the share of the transitory component is higher than 
the share of the permanent, with an average of over 50%. The structure of inequality, however, 
looks similar in 2004 compared with 1988.  
This  information  is  formalized  in  the  time-series  regressions  reported  in  Table  4.  First,  the 
estimates in the restricted model explain a lower share of the variation in the dependent variables 
and show that only the permanent variance plays a significant positive role in the trend increases 
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in inequality. For the transitory component and earnings immobility the model predicts a positive 
trend, but insignificant. Moreover, none appears to be sensitive to the cyclical variations. For 
immobility, none of the explanatory variables are significantly different from zero.  
Therefore,  while  the  estimates  from  the  more  general  model  indicates  that  the  persistent 
component determines the increase in overall inequality overcoming the negative effect of the 
transitory component, this simpler model imposing clearly false restrictions attributes the growth 
in inequality to both components, albeit insignificant for the transitory component.  
8.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Starting with the late 1980s and intensifying after early 1990s, Luxembourg evolved from an 
industrial economy to an economy dominated by the tertiary sector, which relies heavily on the 
cross-border workforce. This paper explored the implications of these labour market structural 
changes for the structure of earnings inequality and earnings mobility. 
Using 17 years of longitudinal earnings information drawn from the administrative data on the 
professional career, we decomposed Luxembourg’s growth in earnings inequality into persistent 
and transitory components and explored the extent to which changes in cross-sectional earnings 
inequality in between 1988 and 2004 reflect changes in the transitory or permanent components 
of earnings.  
Our results  indicate that Luxembourg’s  increase  in  earnings  inequality  has  steamed  from an 
increase  in  the  permanent  component  of  earnings  variation,  whereas  the  transitory  variance 
recorded a decrease. Moreover, earnings immobility increased over the sample period. Thus, 
Luxembourg’s  growth  in  earnings  inequality  reflects  increasing  long-run  (permanent) 
differentials  between  individuals  accompanied  by  decreasing  earnings  mobility,  meaning 
decreasing opportunity for low wage individuals of improving their income position in a lifetime 
perspective.  
While our focus has been to extend the research on earnings dynamics at the European level and 
to understand the driving factors behind the increase in earnings inequality in Luxembourg in the 
context of the labour market structural changes that occurred starting with the late 1980s, we also 
tried to bring a methodological advancement in modelling earnings dynamics. Thanks to the 
large size of our panel, we were able to estimate a more general model that incorporates most of 44 
 
the features identified by the previous research on earnings mobility from the US, Canada and 
Europe.  
First, unlike previous studies, we were able to account for cohort and age effects in a more 
precise way by considering cohorts formed of individuals born in one year, not several years 
pulled together. This is a quite unique feature in the literature given the huge data requirements. 
To our knowledge, only one study had the luxury of capturing the true cohort and age effect, 
Dickens (2000b) for the UK. Moreover, the richness of our data allowed us to incorporate cohort 
loading  factors  both  on  the  permanent  and  transitory  component,  a  feature  which  is  not  so 
common. Most studies used the cohort shifters only on one component.  
Second, for modelling the permanent component, we extended the random walk specification to 
incorporate age-specific innovation variances after age 20 until age 40, and a random effects 
model after age 40 with the distribution of the effects fixed at that implied by the random walk, a 
specification which was used previously only by Dickens (2000b). This model is consistent with 
the  expectations  steaming  from  many  matching  and  human  capital  models,  whereby  human 
capital is accumulated for the first 20 year of labour market experiences, after which between-
individual  differences  stop  growing.  we  attempted  to  incorporate  also  the  random  growth 
specification, as persistent differences between individuals with respect to their human capital 
accumulation do exist. The specifications, however, leaded to identification problems in our data.  
Third,  for  modelling  the  transitory  component,  besides  allowing  for  cohort  specific  initials 
transitory variances to accommodate cohort heterogeneity with respect to the accumulation of the 
transitory process until the start of the panel, we incorporated also age-related heteroskedastic 
transitory innovations to accommodate the lifecycle variation in the volatility of the transitory 
earnings innovations.  
All these specifications, besides being economically plausible were found to be also statistically 
defensible. Specifying models that assume away these features when they are present in the data 
falsely  attribute  the  non-stationarity  that  would  be  captured  by  these  elements  to  the  other 
sources of non-stationarity that remain in their models. Baker and Solon (2003) This statement is 
supported by the practical example carried out by estimating a restricted model, which imposes 
some restrictions that were rejected by our data. we find that imposing the restriction of no age-
specific innovation variances in the random walk and no age-related heteroskedasticity in the 45 
 
transitory innovations exacerbates the importance of the transitory variance in explaining the 
trend  in  the  overall  inequality.  The  sensitivity  of  the  predicted  components  to  the  different 
restrictions shows that when carrying out such a study one has to pay an extensive attention to 
the  information provided  by the autocovariance  structure of earnings and to whether certain 
restrictions fit a specific data or not.  
Whereas this exercise has identified the evolution of the two components over the sample period 
in Luxembourg, it has not identified the factors that might have triggered this evolution. This 
topic is extremely relevant and should be focused by future research. A good starting point is the 
approach taken by Sologon and O’donoghue (2009f), which tried to explain these trends in a 
comparative study at the EU level.  
Another  possible  extension  is  to  test  statistically  the  impact  of  the  labour  market  structural 
changes  on  the  structure  of  earnings  inequality  and  earnings  mobility,  by  including  also 
contextual variables, such as occupation shifters. 
Another point for future research is to explore other measures of earnings mobility, as this topic 
is under researched at the EU level and in Luxembourg. Sologon and O’Donogue (2009e, 2009d) 
explored earnings mobility at the EU level and included also Luxembourg in their study. One 
point of interest would be to see how their results based on panel survey data compares with the 
results using administrative data.  46 
 
9.  TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1. The evolution of the labour market structure by occupation status in Luxembourg in 
1988, 1996 and 2004. 
Note: Own calculations based on IGSS data. Vertical axis – share of workers by occupation 
status 
   
Figure 2. The evolution of the labour market structure by sector of activity status in Luxembourg 
in 1988, 1996 and 2004 








Note: Vertical axis – share of workers by age groups  
 
Figure 3. The evolution of the age structure of the active population in Luxembourg 






Figure 4. The variance and mean of log hourly earnings, 1988-2004 
 
 
Figure 5. The evolution of the labour market structure by occupational status in the sample in 1988, 
1996 and 2004. 





Figure 6. The evolution of the labour market structure by sector in the sample in 1988, 1996 and 
2004. 





















Note: Vertical axis – share of workers by age groups  
 
Figure 7. The evolution of the age structure of the active population in the sample 


























































































































































































































1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
Cohort born 1957
Variance(t) Covariance(t, t-1)
Covariance(t, t-2) Covariance(t, t-3)
Covariance(t, t-4) Covariance(t, t-5)
Covariance(t, t-6) Covariance(t, t-7)
Covariance(t, t-8) Covariance(t, t-9)
Covariance(t, t-10) Covariance(t, t-11)
Covariance(t, t-12) Covariance(t, t-13)
Covariance(t, t-14) Covariance(t, t-15)
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Figure 8. Autocovariance Structure of Earnings for Selected Cohorts: 1940 – 1975 
































































































































































































































































































1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
Cohort born 1975
Variance(t) Covariance(t, t-1)
Covariance(t, t-2) Covariance(t, t-3)
Covariance(t, t-4) Covariance(t, t-5)
Covariance(t, t-6) Covariance(t, t-7)
Covariance(t, t-8) Covariance(t, t-9)
Covariance(t, t-10) Covariance(t, t-11)
Covariance(t, t-12) Covariance(t, t-13)
Covariance(t, t-14) Covariance(t, t-15)
Covariance(t, t-16)
 































































































Figure 9. Lifecycle Autocovariances for Selected Years : 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004 
Note: In the legend, t stands for the each age displayed on the horizontal axis of each graph. 54 
 
 
Figure 10. The pattern of the permanent component without time and cohort loading factors 
Note: Based on the parameters estimates displayed in Table 2 – Base Model. 
 
Figure 11. Year-specific factor loadings on the persistent and transitory components 
Note: Based on the parameters estimates displayed in Table 2 – Base Model. 
 
Figure 12. Cohort-specific loading factors on the permanent and transitory components 
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1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
Cohort born in 
Cohort-specific factor loadings on the permanent component (left Y-axis)
Cohort-specific factor loadings on the transitory component (right Y-axis)55 
 
 
Figure 13. Cohort-specific initial transitory variances 
Note: Based on the parameters estimates displayed in Table 2 – Base Model. 
 
 
Figure 14. The age profile of the variance of the transitory innovation, base model 


























































































































































































































































































































Figure 15. Actual and Predicted Variance of Earnings with Permanent and Transitory Predicted Components 
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Figure 17. Earnings immobility for men by cohort over time – base model 

































Figure 18. Cross-sectional age profile of the permanent and transitory variance for selected years 
Note: vertical axis – permanent variance of log earnings (left), transitory variance of log earnings (right); horizontal axis – age; each 
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Figure 19. Cross-sectional age profile of the share of the permanent component from the overall 
variance for selected years: 1988, 1993, 1998, 2004 
Note:  vertical  axis  –  share  (%)  of  the  permanent  component  from  the  overall  variance  , 










Figure 20. The cross-sectional age –immobility profile for selected years 1988, 1993, 1998, 2004 63 
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Immobility for men aged 30 Immobility for men aged 40
Immobility for men aged 50
 
Figure 22. Earnings immobility for men of age 30, 40 and 50 – base model 
Note: vertical axis – immobility ratio; each line plots the immobility ratio for men aged 30, 40 
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Figure 23. Earnings immobility for men of age 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55 – base model 65 
 
Note: vertical axis – immobility ratio; each line plots the immobility ratio for men aged 20, 25, 
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Table 1. Cohorts Included in the Working Sample 
Cohort born in  Sample Size  Years Observed  Ages Observed 
1940  1862  1988-1997  48-57 
1941  1878  1988-1998  47-57 
1942  2288  1988-1999  46-57 
1943  2495  1988-2000  45-57 
1944  2722  1988-2001  44-57 
1945  2864  1988-2002  43-57 
1946  3622  1988-2003  42-57 
1947  4161  1988-2004  41-57 
1948  4463  1988-2004  40-56 
1949  4725  1988-2004  39-55 
1950  4865  1988-2004  38-54 
1951  5120  1988-2004  37-53 
1952  5712  1988-2004  36-52 
1953  5901  1988-2004  35-51 
1954  6475  1988-2004  34-50 
1955  6564  1988-2004  33-49 
1956  6974  1988-2004  32-48 
1957  7481  1988-2004  31-47 
1958  7828  1988-2004  30-46 
1959  8562  1988-2004  29-45 
1960  8840  1988-2004  28-44 
1961  9621  1988-2004  27-43 
1962  10004  1988-2004  26-42 
1963  10771  1988-2004  25-41 
1964  11523  1988-2004  24-40 
1965  11671  1988-2004  23-39 
1966  11754  1988-2004  22-38 
1967  11928  1988-2004  21-37 
1968  11929  1988-2004  20-36 
1969  11739  1989-2004  20-35 
1970  11617  1990-2004  20-34 
1971  11657  1991-2004  20-33 
1972  11192  1992-2004  20-32 
1973  10443  1993-2004  20-31 
1974  9843  1994-2004  20-30 
1975  9186  1995-2004  20-29 
Total  270280     67 
 
Table 2. Error Component Model Estimates 
  Base model 
Restricted Model 
Random Walk + ARMA(1,1) 
Permanent Component  Exp(Estimate)  Estimate  SE  Exp(Estimate)  Estimate  SE 
20
2 exp( ) estimate µ σ =
 
0.0122  -4.4103  0.0681       
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
      0.0001  -8.9471  0.0831 
21
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0085  -4.7702  0.0668       
22
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0106  -4.5495  0.0589       
23
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0090  -4.7058  0.0599       
24
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0052  -5.2677  0.0616       
25
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0051  -5.2853  0.0639       
26
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0039  -5.5439  0.0653       
27
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0033  -5.7284  0.0675       
28
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0023  -6.0951  0.0744       
29
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0014  -6.5711  0.1053       
30
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0011  -6.8030  0.1501       
31
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0013  -6.6765  0.1434       
32
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0011  -6.8453  0.1868       
33
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0007  -7.3006  0.2934       
34
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0003  -8.0633  0.6885       
35
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0008  -7.0832  0.2881       
36
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0010  -6.9368  0.2537       
37
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0008  -7.1521  0.3257       
38
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0005  -7.6076  0.5160       
39
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0008  -7.1649  0.3545       
40
2 exp( ) estimate π σ =
 
0.0004  -7.9056  0.8928       
Time shifters 1,1988 λ
=1             
1,1989 λ
 
  1.0079  0.0043    0.9131  0.0049 
1,1990 λ
 
  0.9881  0.0059    0.8059  0.0069 
1,1991 λ
 
  1.0219  0.0071    0.7756  0.0074 
1,1992 λ
 




  1.2329  0.0121    0.8867  0.0099 
1,1994 λ
 
  1.2521  0.0136    0.8245  0.0096 
1,1995 λ
 
  1.2682  0.0149    0.7899  0.0095 
1,1996 λ
 
  1.2939  0.0161    0.7566  0.0095 
1,1997 λ
 
  1.3167  0.0174    0.7327  0.0098 
1,1998 λ
 
  1.3488  0.0185    0.7139  0.0099 
1,1999 λ
 
  1.4073  0.0202    0.7046  0.0101 
1,2000 λ
 
  1.4291  0.0214    0.6938  0.0107 
1,2001 λ
 
  1.4689  0.0229    0.6914  0.0114 
1,2002 λ
 
  1.4952  0.0242    0.6892  0.0124 
1,2003 λ
 
  1.5388  0.0258    0.6881  0.0134 
1,2004 λ
 
  1.5601  0.0266    0.6805  0.0142 
Cohort shifters  1,1940 1 γ =
             
1,1941 γ
 
  1.0011  0.0401    1.0361  0.0583 
1,1942 γ
 
  1.0016  0.0381    1.0559  0.0588 
1,1943 γ
 
  0.9924  0.0367    1.0867  0.0585 
1,1944 γ
 
  1.0100  0.0354    1.1290  0.0571 
1,1945 γ
 
  0.9708  0.0343    1.1188  0.0580 
1,1946 γ
 
  0.9763  0.0333    1.1563  0.0569 
1,1947 γ
 
  0.9616  0.0317    1.1600  0.0556 
1,1948 γ
 
  0.9831  0.0320    1.2381  0.0580 
1,1949 γ
 
  0.9519  0.0312    1.2255  0.0581 
1,1950 γ
 
  0.9695  0.0321    1.2742  0.0616 
1,1951 γ
 
  0.9857  0.0319    1.3615  0.0630 
1,1952 γ
 
  0.9583  0.0311    1.3482  0.0634 
1,1953 γ
 
  0.9808  0.0314    1.4439  0.0664 
1,1954 γ
 
  0.9390  0.0305    1.3903  0.0660 
1,1955 γ
 
  0.9709  0.0311    1.5023  0.0700 
1,1956 γ
 
  0.9530  0.0306    1.5502  0.0716 
1,1957 γ
 
  0.9628  0.0308    1.6323  0.0749 
1,1958 γ
 
  0.9878  0.0313    1.7380  0.0793 
1,1959 γ
 
  0.9592  0.0306    1.7389  0.0798 
1,1960 γ
 




  0.9475  0.0279    1.8959  0.0762 
1,1962 γ
 
  0.9553  0.0282    2.0361  0.0818 
1,1963 γ
 
  0.9752  0.0290    2.2006  0.0883 
1,1964 γ
 
  0.9502  0.0284    2.2670  0.0909 
1,1965 γ
 
  0.9425  0.0284    2.3467  0.0941 
1,1966 γ
 
  0.9464  0.0287    2.5782  0.1032 
1,1967 γ
 
  0.9352  0.0285    2.7112  0.1085 
1,1968 γ
 
  0.8821  0.0271    2.7789  0.1111 
1,1969 γ
 
  0.8692  0.0267    2.9177  0.1163 
1,1970 γ
 
  0.8638  0.0265    2.9631  0.1178 
1,1971 γ
 
  0.8500  0.0261    2.8585  0.1135 
1,1972 γ
 
  0.8276  0.0255    2.9451  0.1165 
1,1973 γ
 
  0.8938  0.0273    3.1080  0.1226 
1,1974 γ
 
  0.8861  0.0270    3.0035  0.1185 
1,1975 γ
 
  0.9176  0.0278    2.9632  0.1174 
Transitory Component             
2
0 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
           
2
0,1940 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0597  -2.8182  0.1292  0.0334  -3.3990  0.3236 
2
0,1941 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0411  -3.1928  0.1599  0.0253  -3.6788  0.3853 
2
0,1942 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0433  -3.1406  0.1355  0.0362  -3.3196  0.2597 
2
0,1943 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0331  -3.4075  0.1364  0.0333  -3.4026  0.2468 
2
0,1944 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0369  -3.3000  0.1244  0.0468  -3.0623  0.1692 
2
0,1945 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0264  -3.6340  0.1292  0.0412  -3.1905  0.1757 
2
0,1946 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0292  -3.5322  0.1141  0.0545  -2.9091  0.1235 
2
0,1947 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0229  -3.7765  0.1123  0.0571  -2.8627  0.1066 
2
0,1948 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0235  -3.7510  0.1106  0.0635  -2.7560  0.0971 
2
0,1949 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0199  -3.9187  0.1116  0.0678  -2.6906  0.0907 
2
0,1950 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0170  -4.0770  0.1158  0.0704  -2.6536  0.0838 
2
0,1951 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0152  -4.1881  0.1207  0.0727  -2.6212  0.0840 
2
0,1952 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0139  -4.2731  0.1216  0.0800  -2.5259  0.0775 
2
0,1953 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0130  -4.3393  0.1273  0.0845  -2.4712  0.0768 70 
 
2
0,1954 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0099  -4.6196  0.1296  0.0828  -2.4915  0.0705 
2
0,1955 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0105  -4.5522  0.1349  0.0976  -2.3269  0.0707 
2
0,1956 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0080  -4.8270  0.1429  0.0903  -2.4042  0.0717 
2
0,1957 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0077  -4.8647  0.1450  0.1005  -2.2976  0.0697 
2
0,1958 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0079  -4.8412  0.1482  0.1161  -2.1532  0.0699 
2
0,1959 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0056  -5.1777  0.1517  0.1060  -2.2448  0.0680 
2
0,1960 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0052  -5.2634  0.1429  0.1156  -2.1575  0.0504 
2
0,1961 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0038  -5.5767  0.1492  0.1072  -2.2329  0.0502 
2
0,1962 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0035  -5.6525  0.1550  0.1150  -2.1631  0.0500 
2
0,1963 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0028  -5.8699  0.1617  0.1147  -2.1651  0.0499 
2
0,1964 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0020  -6.2214  0.1690  0.1002  -2.3004  0.0498 
2
0,1965 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0017  -6.3801  0.1740  0.0961  -2.3429  0.0499 
2
0,1966 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0014  -6.5932  0.1771  0.0944  -2.3607  0.0502 
2
0,1967 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0014  -6.6023  0.1795  0.0959  -2.3446  0.0508 
2
0,1968 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0010  -6.9092  0.1859  0.0826  -2.4939  0.0514 
2
0,1969 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0008  -7.1767  0.1849  0.0744  -2.5986  0.0515 
2
0,1970 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0007  -7.2768  0.1844  0.0698  -2.6622  0.0513 
2
0,1971 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0006  -7.3486  0.1836  0.0614  -2.7902  0.0509 
2
0,1972 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0005  -7.6823  0.1819  0.0506  -2.9829  0.0506 
2
0,1973 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0004  -7.8563  0.1824  0.0451  -3.0991  0.0503 
2
0,1974 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0004  -7.9512  0.1816  0.0405  -3.2065  0.0502 
2
0,1975 exp( ) estimate σ =
 
0.0004  -7.7175  0.1824  0.0452  -3.0968  0.0503 
ρ     0.9640  0.0052    0.9508  0.0018 
θ     -0.2060  0.0037    -0.2700  0.0024 
2 exp( ) estimate ε σ =
 
      0.0442  -3.1180  0.0514 
β0    0.0004  0.0001       
β1    -0.0004  0.0000       
β2    0.0001  0.0000       
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Time shifters  2,1988 1 λ =
             
2,1989 λ
 
  0.9258  0.0058    0.9911  0.0038 
2,1990 λ
 
  0.8420  0.0089    0.9716  0.0056 
2,1991 λ
 
  0.7603  0.0110    0.9400  0.0067 
2,1992 λ
 
  0.7626  0.0135    0.9151  0.0078 
2,1993 λ
 
  0.6603  0.0139    0.9010  0.0086 
2,1994 λ
 
  0.6153  0.0145    0.9211  0.0090 
2,1995 λ
 
  0.5781  0.0151    0.9217  0.0091 
2,1996 λ
 
  0.5310  0.0153    0.9200  0.0092 
2,1997 λ
 
  0.4925  0.0155    0.9152  0.0094 
2,1998 λ
 
  0.4466  0.0152    0.9015  0.0096 
2,1999 λ
 
  0.3898  0.0143    0.8815  0.0099 
2,2000 λ
 
  0.3579  0.0140    0.8622  0.0107 
2,2001 λ
 
  0.3293  0.0138    0.8504  0.0116 
2,2002 λ
 
  0.2990  0.0134    0.8208  0.0127 
2,2003 λ
 
  0.2710  0.0131    0.8060  0.0142 
2,2004 λ
 
  0.2487  0.0129    0.7886  0.0155 
Cohort shifters  2,1940 1 γ =
             
2,1941 γ
 
  1.1373  0.0521    1.0572  0.0363 
2,1942 γ
 
  1.1860  0.0543    1.0323  0.0358 
2,1943 γ
 
  1.3352  0.0592    1.0617  0.0359 
2,1944 γ
 
  1.3868  0.0601    1.0368  0.0337 
2,1945 γ
 
  1.5069  0.0667    1.0411  0.0347 
2,1946 γ
 
  1.5928  0.0696    1.0246  0.0330 
2,1947 γ
 
  1.8069  0.0782    1.0661  0.0328 
2,1948 γ
 
  1.8197  0.0835    1.0163  0.0322 
2,1949 γ
 
  1.9607  0.0915    1.0130  0.0314 
2,1950 γ
 
  2.1941  0.1079    1.0598  0.0333 
2,1951 γ
 
  2.2548  0.1154    1.0201  0.0317 
2,1952 γ
 
  2.4227  0.1302    1.0230  0.0314 
2,1953 γ
 
  2.4951  0.1423    0.9973  0.0315 
2,1954 γ
 




  2.9363  0.1853    1.0216  0.0324 
2,1956 γ
 
  3.0621  0.2029    0.9973  0.0316 
2,1957 γ
 
  3.2217  0.2222    0.9817  0.0313 
2,1958 γ
 
  3.3996  0.2435    0.9753  0.0317 
2,1959 γ
 
  3.8064  0.2785    1.0066  0.0314 
2,1960 γ
 
  4.0505  0.2903    0.9904  0.0247 
2,1961 γ
 
  4.4171  0.3283    0.9923  0.0248 
2,1962 γ
 
  4.5102  0.3462    0.9466  0.0237 
2,1963 γ
 
  4.8457  0.3850    0.9424  0.0236 
2,1964 γ
 
  5.3518  0.4412    0.9490  0.0238 
2,1965 γ
 
  5.8114  0.4960    0.9544  0.0240 
2,1966 γ
 
  6.1591  0.5430    0.9070  0.0229 
2,1967 γ
 
  6.7065  0.6104    0.8898  0.0225 
2,1968 γ
 
  7.6686  0.7202    0.8706  0.0220 
2,1969 γ
 
  8.1754  0.7665    0.8558  0.0217 
2,1970 γ
 
  8.2511  0.7724    0.8524  0.0216 
2,1971 γ
 
  8.4753  0.7908    0.8900  0.0224 
2,1972 γ
 
  8.8249  0.8197    0.8773  0.0221 
2,1973 γ
 
  8.2619  0.7680    0.8924  0.0225 
2,1974 γ
 
  8.1837  0.7567    0.9057  0.0228 
2,1975 γ
 
  7.5667  0.6990    0.9082  0.0228 
SSR  0.0644  0.0773 
2 χ  
5390.3708 (df=166)  7541.0155 
BIC  1.9311E-05  2.2095E-05 
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Table 3. Wald tests of model restrictions in the base model 
Restriction  χ2 
Degrees  of 
freedom 
P-value 
(1)  21 22 40
2 2 2 ... 0 π π π σ σ σ = = = =
  
(no random walk) 
10326.6302  31  0.0001 
(2)  21 22 40
2 2 2 2 ... π π π π σ σ σ σ = = = =
  
(no age-specific innovation variance) 
2463.3344  21  0.0001 
(3)  1 2 3 4 0, 0, 0, 0 β β β β = = = =
  
(no age-related heteroskedastic transitory shocks) 
2963.499  4  0.0001 
 
Table 4. Trend and cyclical variation of the persistent and transitory components, base and 
restricted model 
Dependent Variable  Linear trend  Real GDP growth rate  Adjusted R2 
  Est  SE  Est  SE   
Base Model           
Permanent Variance  0.0060  0.0003  -0.0235  0.0504  96.80% 
Transitory Variance  -0.0022  0.0004  -0.1947  0.0740  61.05% 
Immobility  0.1217  0.011  1.8663  1.9257  88.75% 
           
Restricted Model           
Permanent Variance  0.0029  0.0006  -0.0504  0.1106  58.49% 
Transitory Variance  0.0015  0.0009  -0.1193  0.1526  15.54% 
Immobility  0.0149  0.013  0.5118  2.2663  8.72% 
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